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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last decades, a trend towards the globalization of business—and
of software-intensive sectors in particular—has emerged. These circum-
stances, in addition to new technical solutions, have had a large impact
on software development. Because of advantages like cost savings, ac-
cess to world-class IT professionals, and shortened time-to-market, sev-
eral companies explore these new opportunities.
Global Software Outsourcing, or GSO, can be described as “a rel-
atively long-term relationship between firms based in different countries
to enable software development to be carried out primarily off-shore (in
the premises of the firm doing the development)” (Sahay, Krishna, and
Nicholson 2003, p. 3). Thus, the core of GSO is software development
taking place outside the national border of the customer country. The
phenomenon has also been labelled Information Systems Outsourcing
(Yang and Huang 2000), Offshore Sourcing (Marriot 2003), and Global
Software Development (Carmel and Agarwal 2001).
This trend also brings along questions about how to successfully op-
erate across national and cultural boundaries. In this thesis, a better
understanding of trust is suggested as a way to deal with some of these
problems. The motivation for this approach is that trust is seen to have
several advantages in GSO relationships; it enables cooperative beha-
vior, reduces conflicts, decreases transaction costs, and promotes effect-
ive responses to crises (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998). Fur-
thermore, it may “promote open exchange of information and ’interor-
ganizational learning”’(Sydow 1998, p. 32), and “act as an obstacle to
opportunistic behavior” (Karahannas and Jones 1999, p. 347).
For several reasons, the literature on Norwegian GSO projects is very
limited. This thesis applies concepts of trust to a GSO project—the Sa-
larySystem project—having a Norwegian customer and a Russian sup-
plier. The companies are given the pseudonyms ScanSys and RussCo
respectively. The findings provided will hopefully contribute to a better
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understanding of GSO relationships within this particular context1.
1.1 Objectives
Within the problem area of this thesis described above, this thesis aims
at the following:
Identify and describe trust in Global Software Outsourcing
relationships.
This objective is based upon the assumption that trust is needed in
GSO projects. However, this assumption will be a subject of investiga-
tion too. When discussing the objective, the goal is to achieve the fol-
lowing:
• Provide a better understanding of trust.
• Use this understanding to suggest ways to perform successful GSO
projects.
1.2 Background
GSO as a phenomenon is relatively new, starting in the early 1990s (Kob-
itzsch, Rombach, and Feldmann 2001). However, its roots go back to
hardware outsourcing in the 1960s (Lee, Huynh, Kwok, and Pi 2003).
During these years, GSO has become a multibillion industry growing
from an annual global IT outsourcing market of $96 billion in 1998 to
$151 billion in 2000 (Khan, Currie, Weerakkody, and Desai 2003).
The customer countries involved in GSO worldwide are to a large
extent located either in Europe or North America—the United States
being the largest. Computer-job-related wages moving outside the latter
is estimated to $6.5 billion by 2005 (McLaughlin 2003). Other significant
customer countries are Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
The undisputed software supplier is India: “India dominates 80–90
per cent of the total of offshore development revenue worldwide and is
expected to be the key leader in offshore outsourcing in the next 5 years”
(Khan, Currie, Weerakkody, and Desai 2003, p. 240). Other software
supplier countries are shown in table 1.1 on the next page, classified by
status in the global market.
1The problem of generalization from single interpretive case studies is discussed in
section 1.3 on page 9.
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Leaders India
Challengers Canada, China, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Is-
rael, Mexico, Northern Ireland, Philippines, Poland,
Russia, South Africa
Up and
Comers
Belarus, Brazil, Caribbean, Egypt, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, New Zealand, Singapore, Ukraine,
Venezuela
Beginners Bangladesh, Cuba, Ghana, Korea, Malaysia, Mauri-
tius, Nepal, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Vi-
etnam
Table 1.1: GSO suppliers and status (Gartner 2003).
1.2.1 Norway as a software customer
Historically, the Norwegian software sector has not been very visible in
the global domain. There have been pockets of some offshore work be-
ing undertaken by Norwegian firms in India and Russia though. The
relatively low international presence of Norwegian companies has sev-
eral reasons. One is the competitive oil and gas industry which has led
to a certain degree of neglect by the Norwegian government of other sec-
tors like software (Reve and Jakobsen 2001; Økonomisk Rapport 2003).
Moreover, Norway being a small country with respect to population, the
IT industry has not been very visible worldwide. The total value of the
Norwegian IT services market reached e 2.2 billion in 2000 and is expec-
ted to grow to approximately e 3.7 billion in 2005 (Fujitsu Invia Group
2002).
1.2.2 Russia as a software supplier
Russia became a global software supplier as a result of the fall of the
Soviet Union, when lots of highly skilled people previously working in
scientific and defense establishments were left jobless (Terekhov 2001).
Since then, the growth has been substantial. In 2002, the size of the Rus-
sian software services was estimated to $150–$250 million (Lane 2003)
having an expected growth rate at 40–50% a year (The Russia Journal
2003). The Russian educational system is known for its high technical
level—students from the St. Petersburg State University won the “ACM
International Collegiate Programming Contest” both in 2000 and 2001
(ICPC 2003). This high educational level is also mirrored in the Rus-
sian software companies: “77.4 percent of Russian software companies
employ PhDs while in 45.8 percent of these companies, PhDs make up
about 10 percent of their staff” (Terekhov 2001, p. 99). However, the
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Russian software industry also faces some challenges. The country is
known both for its low IT infrastructure capability and lack of English
proficiency in the population (Marriot 2003; Pries-Heje, Baskerville, and
Hansen 2003). Russia’s reputation for unlicensed software is a problem
too: “Russian salespeople say they spend 80 percent of their time selling
Russia and only 20 percent selling products” (Marriot 2003, p. 6).
Figure 1.1 shows the software piracy rates in different countries which
are defined as “the volume of software pirated as a percent of total soft-
ware installed in each country” (Business Software Association 2002, p.
9). As seen in the figure, software piracy is more common in Russia com-
pared to Norway, Denmark, and the US.
Figure 1.1: Piracy rates in different countries (Business Software Associ-
ation 2002).
This view is further confirmed by Novell2 who in its November 1998
Duma testimony said: “80–90% of all the information systems in Russia
are based on one or another version of Novell Netware” (McHenry and
Malkov 1999, p. 15). Software piracy is a risk in the GSO context be-
cause some software suppliers illegally sell the same or a similar product
to the system being developed to a third party (The Russia Journal 2002).
2See www.novell.com.
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1.2.3 Strategies for GSO relationships
GSO relationships are taking place using several different organizational
relationships. These are briefly outlined below:
Wholly owned subsidiary: Some software supplier firms own facilities
overseas to perform analysis and design work at the customer’s
site, while the rest of the development process is performed in In-
dia or Russia (Khan, Currie, Weerakkody, and Desai 2003). Some
software customers use this strategy too, either by setting an office
offshore—in the country where the software supplier is located—
or buying an existing company and make it work together with the
already existing organization (Carmel and Agarwal 2001). Using
this strategy makes it easier to make the requirements specification
since the two parties are located in the same country (Khan, Cur-
rie, Weerakkody, and Desai 2003). However, the necessary invest-
ments are significant, thus mainly large companies use this strategy.
Microsoft, Oracle, Motorola, Ericsson, and General Electric are ex-
amples of companies which have set up software development cen-
ters in India (Sudan 2000). In ScanSys, the strategy for growth
prior to the SalarySystem project, was through acquisitions of ex-
isting companies. ScanSys considered this strategy prior to the Sa-
larySystem project, but found the initial investments being too big.
Joint venture: Establishing a joint venture means setting up a new com-
pany to run a contract where the customer and the software sup-
plier collaborate. Both parties invest money, so there is a large de-
gree of equity present. Furthermore, this strategy involves risk be-
cause of the money that has to be invested. Joint ventures are used
by software companies to enter new markets (Carmel and Agarwal
2001; Khan, Currie, Weerakkody, and Desai 2003). However, the
strategy might be difficult to use because of language differences
(Khan, Currie, Weerakkody, and Desai 2003).
Direct outsourcing to supplier firms: The IT manager or a representat-
ive from the customer manages the project from their office, while
the development work is carried out offshore (Carmel and Agar-
wal 2001; Khan, Currie, Weerakkody, and Desai 2003; Gallivan
and Oh 1999). This strategy was used in the SalarySystem project.
Direct outsourcing to the supplier may be hampered because of dif-
ficulties in choosing the appropriate supplier and explaining the
requirements of the product because of differences in language and
culture (Khan, Currie, Weerakkody, and Desai 2003). This is the
most common strategy in GSO projects (Gallivan and Oh 1999).
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Multiple Outsourcing Suppliers: The customer company uses several
software suppliers to develop the software (Khan, Currie, Weerak-
kody, and Desai 2003). The advantage of this strategy is the possib-
ility of getting access to the appropriate skills, but it also includes
problems of coordinating the project(s) (Gallivan and Oh 1999).
Through a third party: Marketing agents or a third party firm is involved
in managing the project (Khan, Currie, Weerakkody, and Desai
2003). Using this strategy, the customer does not have to spend
time on coordinating the work. However, the strategy includes the
risk of loosing touch with the project which, in turn, may cause the
product becoming different compared to what was initially inten-
ded (Khan, Currie, Weerakkody, and Desai 2003).
Body shopping: A contract employee is being managed by the customer
(Heeks, Krishna, Nicholson, and Sahay 2001; Khan, Currie, Weer-
akkody, and Desai 2003; Nicholson and Sahay 2001). Using this
strategy, the work is taking place on site rather than offshore. This
strategy includes low investments for the customer (Khan, Currie,
Weerakkody, and Desai 2003).
As described above, GSO projects take place using a number of dif-
ferent strategies associated with strengths and weaknesses. This diversity
implies that GSO is a concept consisting of several forms and arrange-
ments.
1.2.4 Accelerators
There are several reasons for the growth of GSO over the last 10–15
years. One reason is the opportunity of reduced costs because of cheap
labor (Herbsleb and Moitra 2001; Heeks, Krishna, Nicholson, and Sahay
2001; Marriot 2003; Kobitzsch, Rombach, and Feldmann 2001; Khan,
Currie, Weerakkody, and Desai 2003; Carmel 1999; McFarlan and Nolan
1995). Because the salaries of software developers are higher in Northern
America and Western Europe compared to other countries, the potential
for lower development costs exists. Table 1.2 on the next page shows the
basic salary of software developers in different countries. A rough estim-
ate of the corresponding Norwegian salaries—based on NIF (2002)—is
$45 000–$65 000.
However, GSO relationships, compared to in-house projects3, in-
clude an overhead in relation to communication, knowledge sharing,
project management, coordination, and travel costs, so the savings are
3In-house projects are performed within the organization as opposed to GSO projects
which are performed by another company.
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Country Base annual Salary
(US $)
China $4750
India $5850
Philippines $6550
Russia $7500
Indonesia $12 200
Japan $44 000
United States $63 000
Table 1.2: The basic salary of software developers in different countries
(Khan, Currie, Weerakkody, and Desai 2003).
smaller than the salary differences in table 1.2 may indicate. The poten-
tial for cost savings are significant though: “Industry analysts estimate
that hiring programmers outside the US in locales such as India saves
about 30 percent in salary costs” (McLaughlin 2003, p. 114).
Another advantage of GSO is the possibility to decrease the skills
shortage (Heeks, Krishna, Nicholson, and Sahay 2001; Marriot 2003;
Kobitzsch, Rombach, and Feldmann 2001; Carmel 1999). The needed
competence may sometimes be unavailable both within the company’s
organization and inside the customer country itself. Such skills are in
many cases available on the global market.
At last, GSO projects sometimes take place because of the need for
short development time—enabled by a large pool of available developers
(Herbsleb and Moitra 2001; Marriot 2003; Carmel 1999).
There were two main reasons for SalarySystem becoming a GSO pro-
ject: first, ScanSys needed the software to be developed at a low cost, and
second, the company lacked Delphi developers inside its organization.
These reasons are further elaborated in chapter 3.
1.2.5 Inhibitors
During the last decade, companies have faced many problems related
to GSO projects. Such projects are quite different from projects tak-
ing place in-house—a difference which makes such projects difficult to
manage. Since the customer and the supplier in GSO projects are some-
times located in different time zones, managing this difference may be
problematic (Marriot 2003; Kobitzsch, Rombach, and Feldmann 2001).
Although asynchronous communication—taking place using e-mail, on-
line discussion groups, and bug tracking databases—is useful, this kind
of communication is considered second best compared to synchronous
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communication (Carmel and Agarwal 2001). Synchronous communica-
tion like telephone calls and video conferencing are important because
they enable problems and misunderstandings more easily to be resolved
at an early stage. However, the use of such “real time” communication
tools requires time zone differences to be less than a normal day at work
between the sites of the customer and the supplier. Thus, if the difference
is more than, say, eight hours, synchronous communication tools are not
useful unless project members from (at least) one of the sites stay at work
outside regular office hours.
Geographical distance may also include differences in language and
culture between the GSO partners (Marriot 2003; Kobitzsch, Rombach,
and Feldmann 2001). Such differences can cause misunderstandings and
communication problems. One example of cultural differences that may
affect communication, is high and low context communication: “In low
context communication, [. . . ] the success of the interaction rests primar-
ily on the sender of the message. [. . . ] In contrast, high context commu-
nication is implicit in nature” (Nance and Strohmaier 1994, p. 117). That
is, while low context communication is the spoken words, high context
communication sometimes convey more information about the topic be-
ing discussed than the spoken words themselves. In Norway low context
communication is most common, while Russia is seen to rely on high
context communication (St.Amant 2002). In the SalarySystem project,
such problems occurred when the Norwegians expected the Russians to
be straightforward when reporting the project status, while the Russians
expected the Norwegians to “read between the lines”.
Also, if the understanding of the problem domain of the project re-
quires extensive knowledge, such knowledge needs to be shared: “[. . . ]
when a company has specialized for several years in developing control
software for a very specific domain—such as for nuclear power plants or
cardiac pacemakers—it must usually transfer the knowledge it has gained
about the specific control algorithms to the partners” (Kobitzsch, Rom-
bach, and Feldmann 2001, p. 80).
Another problem experienced in GSO projects, is inadequate infra-
structure (Marriot 2003; Kobitzsch, Rombach, and Feldmann 2001). The
problem is present especially in some of the supplier countries, for in-
stance China, Hungary, and Russia (Marriot 2003). If transport and data
transmission is being hampered, such difficulties may cause delays and
frustrations in the project.
At last, both the customer and the developer in GSO projects lack
full control (Sabherwal 1999; Marriot 2003). Because the GSO partner
is located far away, his or her actions are invisible and may be difficult
to understand. According to Giddens (1990) uncertainty and lack of
control are the prime conditions for trust. That is, if the trustee cannot
control the trustor, trust is likely to emerge as a “substitute”. As a result,
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the role of trust in GSO relationships is the focus of this thesis.
1.3 Research approach
In this section I present the research approach used to explore the prob-
lem statement of the thesis. One of the research goals is to understand
more about GSO as a phenomenon with a focus on issues of trust, and
examine how these issues can be managed better with a view to improve
the performance of such relationships. Since the focus is on understand-
ing, and to some extent change, an interpretive research approach is
chosen.
1.3.1 Interpretive research
Following the classification of Braa and Vidgen (2000), there are two sep-
arate research approaches used in IS research: positivist and interpret-
ivist. Positivist research assumes that a phenomenon can be observed
objectively. The researcher is observing on the “outside” without influen-
cing the research. Interpretivist research is concerned with interpreting
and describing a phenomenon where the researcher tries to understand
the insider’s point of view, even by becoming an insider in the research.
A further distinction to make in this context is the role of the re-
searcher. Walsham (1995) identifies two roles within the interpretivist
approach: the outside observer and the involved researcher. The advant-
age of being an outside observer is that personnel will be honest because
the researcher has no personal interest. On the other had, he or she may
not get access to all data. The advantage of being an involved researcher
is the possibility of getting access to much data, including sensitive in-
formation. The disadvantage is being too involved in the field site, at the
risk of taking a consultancy role. Having the research goal of this thesis
in mind, the involved researcher role was chosen—aiming at understand-
ing the project, and to a lesser degree influencing change.
The specific methods for gaining knowledge using an interpretive re-
search approach include interviews, attendance at meetings, discussions
with the people studied, looking at documents, and interpreting the use
of tools and artefacts (Klein and Myers 1999). A way of describing this
approach is the following: “What we call our data are really our own con-
structions of other people’s constructions of what they and their compat-
riots are up to” (Walsham 1995, p. 75). Thus, interpretation is the sub-
jective result of all the different ways of trying to understand the project.
Because of this, interpretivists need to explicitly say how they arrived at
their results.
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Action case
By focusing on the intended outcome of research; change, prediction,
and understanding are identified. Figure 1.2 on the facing page from
Braa and Vidgen (2000) shows these outcomes and their interconnec-
tions. Although the initial focus in the research was on understanding,
the following quote shows that I also caused change:
Regarding our plans for the future, the cooperation with [Rus-
sCo] will be based on the [ScanSys] experience and advice
from the University of Oslo. We will try to improve and de-
velop this new knowledge.
— ScanSys company manager
During the research, the change I caused was found to be a useful
way of testing the validity of my interpretations. Thus, without changing
the focus of the research, change was seen as a useful way of gaining new
knowledge. However, since the change I caused on the research site was
more a side-effect than an intended outcome, labelling my field study
“action research” would consequently be incorrect. Instead, I choose to
follow Braa and Vidgen (2000) in their concept of action case which is
seen as a “hybrid of understanding and change” (Braa and Vidgen 2000,
p. 249).
Reflections
The main advantage of using an interpretive research approach is the
possibility of getting access to divine data (Walsham 1995). Such data
may, in turn, enable a broad understanding of the research site.
A problem of single interpretive case studies is how to generalize the
results from them. The short answer is to generalize the results as tend-
encies, not predictions (Walsham 1995). In this thesis, the results are
presented as such tendencies based on an iterative process of empirical
data analysis and literature. Another problem connected to interpretive
research is the difficulty of reporting the part one has had in the project
(Walsham 1995). Because the researcher works inside the context of the
research, he or she will cause varying degrees of change depending on the
nature of his or her involvement. For instance, my interpretation of the
role of one of the individuals involved in the SalarySystem project, the
“Cultural Liaison” described in section 3.3.1 on page 34, was discussed
with the “Cultural Liaison” himself. Also, by sending an early version of
a report (Imsland, Sahay, and Wartiainen 2003) to ScanSys and RussCo,
my presence in the SalarySystem project caused change I cannot separ-
ate from the rest of the project. Furthermore, ScanSys sponsored one of
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action
research
soft
case
action
case
prediction understanding
change
Figure 1.2: Research methods (Braa and Vidgen 2000).
the trips to Russia financially which had the potential of influencing my
autonomy in the project. However, I was never instructed in any way
what to write, rather the opposite was explicitly encouraged:
You write whatever you want. I am interested in your opinion
from an outside point of view.
— ScanSys company manager
These actions—including the feedback and comments I got—increas-
ed my understanding of the project. One example is my suggestion of
enabling more communication channels between ScanSys and RussCo,
where I received the following feedback:
I do not agree with you. Spaghetti communication will always
lead to failure.
— ScanSys development director
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This feedback made me reconsider my view of what is the most ap-
propriate interorganizational communication model in GSO projects.
1.3.2 What has been done
The study of the ScanSys–RussCo GSO relationship started in the sum-
mer of 2002—six months after start of the SalarySystem project—and las-
ted till the summer of 2003. The data has been collected in several ways
including interviews, attendance at meetings, informal discussions when
“hanging around” the research site, observation of project members at
work, document analysis, reading e-mail transcripts, and examining how
to use some of the tools from the SalarySystem project.
In Norway, the research took place mainly at the Norwegian ScanSys
headquarters where most of the project staff was located. The support
department for SalarySystem at Gran was also visited in addition to the
ScanSys subsidiary in Sandnes. The research also included two trips to
St. Petersburg, Russia where the RussCo headquarters is located.
The interviews
Most of the interviews were made together with two other people from
the University of Oslo; a cand. scient. student and a professor. The inter-
views took place with one up to three interviewers, and lasted from 30 to
120 minutes. During the research, we conducted 27 interviews with 22
different people. We also attended several meetings concerning the pro-
ject in different ways. At these meetings there were from three up to ten
people in addition to the interviewers. Table 1.3 on the facing page shows
the interviewees and their roles in the project. Except from the “Presid-
ent and CEO4” of “Indian Supplier Company”—an Indian experienced
in GSO—all interviewees were connected to the SalarySystem project in
one way or the other. The interviewees were chosen from all hierarchical
levels in ScanSys and RussCo, covering as many different roles as pos-
sible. By choosing a heterogeneous collection of interviewees, a broader
understanding of the project was hopefully achieved. Simultaneously, by
interviewing key people of the project several times, in-depth informa-
tion was found.
In the study we chose a semi-structured interviewing approach which
is defined as follows: ”Instead of designing a priori a specific set of ques-
tions to be asked in a specific order, analysts have various types of ques-
tions at their disposal to be used in opportunistic ways, depending on the
demands of the situation” (Wood 1997, p. 52). The advantage of such an
approach is a flexible interview where interesting issues can be followed
4Chief Executive Officer.
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Role Company # interviews # meetings
Company Manager ScanSys 2 4
General Manager ScanSys 3
Test Coordinator ScanSys 3
Developer ScanSys 1
Project Manager ScanSys 1 1
Support Coordinator ScanSys 1
Tester III ScanSys 1
Development Director ScanSys 1 3
Technology Director ScanSys 1 2
Project Leader
(on previous
GSO projects)
ScanSys 1
The “Cultural Liaison” — 1 3
President and CEO Indian
Supplier
Company
1
General Manager RussCo 3 1
Tester I RussCo 1
Tester II RussCo 1
Former Project
Manager
RussCo 1
Managing Director RussCo 1
Project member RussCo 1
Project Coordinator RussCo 1 1
The “Delphi Guru” RussCo 1
Developer I RussCo 1
Developer III RussCo 1
Developer IV RussCo 1
Developer II RussCo 1
Project Manager RussCo 1
Sum 27 20
Table 1.3: Attendance at interviews and meetings.
up by additional questions (Repstad 1998). Because our understanding
of the project was limited when the study started, we found it useful to
let the interviewee speak about what he or she believed was important in
the project. This way we also got a better understanding of what events
were necessary to explore in more detail. Only when the interviewee
talked about events irrelevant to the project, we found it necessary to in-
terrupt. Our interview guide, with the questions we had at our disposal,
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can be found in appendix A on page 102. The interview guide includes
four kinds of questions:
1. General questions asked initially in the research process.
2. Specific questions asked as the understanding of the project in-
creased.
3. Introducing theoretical concepts.
4. Ad hoc questions.
The first kind of questions was asked in the beginning of the case
study. At that time, we needed a general overview of the project in order
to pinpoint interesting issues. Later, when our understanding increased,
we added questions of the second kind which were more specific with
respect to the focus of our research. We also introduced some theoretical
concepts (third kind) like “local knowledge”5 and the different attributes
of trust described in section 2.2 on page 20. We did this only when we felt
the interviewee had no more to say about an issue unless we introduced
our concepts. By using our theoretical ideas in such a way, we also got
an impression of how well these ideas fitted with the events they were
supposed to describe. At last, the ad hoc questions in the interview guide
(fourth kind) are examples of questions we asked spontaneously because
we believed they were relevant for our understanding of the project.
When we had identified some issues and episodes we believed was
important to the project, we asked other interviewees to comment the
same episodes in order to get a better understanding of what happened.
One example of such an episode was the removal of the first RussCo
project manager described in section 3.4.3 on page 40.
We usually started the interviews by introducing ourselves and told
about our roles and intentions in the project. Also, we performed the
interviews without recorder. Since we were three interviewers on most
of the interviews, we found it unnecessary to take the extra workload of
typing the interviews from the recorder. Instead we made notes during
the interviews and typed them into a PC as soon as possible after the in-
terviews were made as suggested by Walsham (1995). We also discussed
the interviews and filled in missing parts, or cleared up eventual misun-
derstandings. After typing an interview, we added a part called “personal
opinion”. This part was useful because we got more impressions from
the interviews than the spoken words. Examples of such impressions in-
clude body language, emotions, or if we felt the interviewee did not tell
the truth.
5The knowledge which was in the heads of people and embedded in work practises.
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Literature study
Although GSO is a relatively new phenomenon, there is an abundant
number of articles to choose from in scientific databases like ACM6 and
IEEE7. Thus, the challenge was to choose the most relevant literature
rather than how to find it. Because my area of interest primarily was
related trust in GSO project, I was able to choose from a smaller se-
lection. Despite the abundance of literature on GSO in general, close to
nothing was found about GSO relationships with Norwegian companies.
However, I found that GSO experiences from other countries in Western
Europe and North America were useful to some extent.
Literature on trust was also available in large amount. The concept
of trust has been found interesting in a number of different disciplines,
and because I wanted a broad starting point when I defined trust, I chose
literature from disciplines like psychology, sociology, and economics.
The goal of the literature study was to get an appropriate understand-
ing of GSO with a focus on problems and solutions. Thus, the literature
study and the analysis of the field data took place as an iterative process
as suggested in Walsham (1995). Furthermore, the literature study also
served the purpose of making the attributes of trust able to identify trust
in the SalarySystem project.
Other sources of data
From the SalarySystem project, I had access to a number of different
documents. Some examples include the Software Requirements Spe-
cification, a test case, the test plan, two weekly status reports from Rus-
sia, e-mail transcripts, and several documents describing SalarySystem.
Some of these documents were useful for the historical reconstruction we
made since our study started six months after the SalarySystem project
was launched. Also, the software analysis documents like the Software
Requirements Specification and the test case was important in order to
analyze the knowledge sharing between ScanSys and RussCo.
Another way of collecting data from the SalarySystem project was by
analyzing the use of TestTool—the tool used for managing bugs in the
SalarySystem source code. By learning how to use this application, a
better understanding of the software development process was achieved.
In addition, the use of TestTool was further investigated by observing
some of the SalarySystem project members while using the application.
6See portal.acm.org.
7See ieeexplore.ieee.org.
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1.4 Limitations
This thesis focuses on trust in GSO relationships—two large areas of
research. Thus, there is a need to limit the focus in order to fit with the
scope of this thesis.
Trust is often discussed in relation to concepts like risk, control, and
power. In this thesis, none of these will be the discussed explicitly. In-
stead, they are discussed when their presence are important for the un-
derstanding of trust.
Although GSO provides the empirical background of this thesis, an
extensive discussion of the phenomenon will not be made. For instance,
GSO relationships exist in a context where culture and language makes
communication difficult. These issues will not be discussed in detail.
However, issues of communication are addressed by Wartiainen (2003)
using the empirical findings from the SalarySystem project too. Further-
more, the technical issues related to software development like method-
ology and programming will not be emphasized either.
The empirical data has also limited the focus in several ways. The
study of the SalarySystem project lasted for approximately one year and
included neither the beginning nor the end of the project.
1.5 Outline of the thesis
This chapter has introduced GSO and established the need for trust in
such projects followed by a presentation of the research approach. The
remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework wherein trust is discussed
in addition to an evaluation of the suggested attributes of trust.
Chapter 3 describes the SalarySystem project in a chronological way;
from the first version of the product to the end of the re-engineering
project. The two companies in the project; ScanSys and RussCo,
and the product; SalarySystem, are described too.
Chapter 4 provides an analysis where the suggested attributes of trust
are applied on the SalarySystem project.
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings from chapter 4. Based on these find-
ings, the understanding of trust and the role of trust in GSO rela-
tionships are discussed.
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings from this thesis and discusses direc-
tions for future research.
Chapter 2
Trust
In this chapter, the framework which trust is discussed within is presen-
ted. Since trust is a complex phenomenon and difficult to identify, seven
identifiable attributes of trust are suggested. In order to give the attrib-
utes explanatory power in the GSO context, some factors about trust are
considered important for the attributes to address too. First, the factors
about trust are presented in addition to how they are addressed by the
attributes of trust. Second, the attributes are described in turn. At last,
the attributes of trust are evaluated.
2.1 The complexity of trust
This thesis focuses on understanding the role of trust in GSO relation-
ships. In such relationships, establishing trust is suggested to have sev-
eral advantages. Because companies participating in GSO relationships
are geographically separated, several risks appear as a consequence of
lack of information about what the partner is doing. This uncertainty
has to be replaced by something which decisions can be based upon,
and in this thesis trust is seen as a possible solution: “Trust is related
to absence in time and space. There would be no need to trust anyone,
neither individuals nor abstract systems, if their activities were visible
and easy to understand. So the prime condition for trust is lack of full
information” (Giddens 1990, p. 33). This relationship between trust and
risk is also acknowledged by Das and Teng (2001) and Karahannas and
Jones (1999).
Trust as a phenomenon is complex and has many meanings, and
no widely acknowledged definition of the term exists. The definitions
and conceptualizations about trust are diverging even if they include
some shared characteristics (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998).
The study of these shared characteristics forms the basis for understand-
ing trust in this thesis; the characteristics are presented as attributes of
17
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trust. The following attributes are identified: predictability, compet-
ence, structure, calculation, goodwill, knowledge, and betrayal. The
selection of these attributes is based on the study of relevant literature
with the purpose of making them identifiable in the GSO context. In
order to achieve this, there are several factors that have to be considered.
These factors are seen to be necessary to be addressed for the attributes
of trust to have explanatory power in the GSO context. The connections
between the factors and the attributes of trust are depicted in table 2.1 on
the facing page. As seen in the table, all the factors are addressed by the
attributes. Below is an outline of the factors, and how they are addressed
by the attributes of trust.
The notion of trust has been studied by a number of disciplines, each
emphasizing different aspects: “researchers in different disciplines have
viewed trust along different dimensions” (Kim and Prabhakar 2000, p.
538). Economists tend to view trust as calculative, psychologists em-
phasize the personal attributes, while sociologists consider the institu-
tional properties (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998). In this
thesis, ideas from all these three disciplines are drawn upon because as-
pects from economics, sociology, and psychology are seen to be relevant
in GSO relationships.
In GSO relationships trust is important within and between organ-
izations, and is different in these two settings (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt,
and Camerer 1998; Sydow 1998). This thesis looks at trust in both these
environments.
Trust has also been found to differ regarding what organizational
level it is studied. Because trust is different at the individual, group, and
institutional level (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998; Sydow
1998), this thesis will consider trust at different levels too.
Trust has not only to do with relationships between humans, but also
concerns systems. While trust in humans stems from interaction, trust in
abstract systems has its source in faith in the correctness of principles
(Giddens 1990). Both personal and system related trust is addressed in
this thesis.
Trust has been found to change over time (Sydow 1998). Usually,
three phases are identified: building, stability, and dissolution (Rousseau,
Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998; Child 1998). In this thesis, trust will be
considered during the whole project—from the formation of the relation-
ship to the end of the project, and how it changes over time.
Trust does not have a constant degree, but is found to have varying
degrees. The degree of trust in a relationship may vary over time, as well
as between different relationships: “It is possible to both over and under-
invest in trust, and neither is desirable from either a moral or strategic
point of view” (Wicks, Berman, and Jones 1999, p. 99). Because it is pos-
sible to trust little or more, trust is said to have a dynamic nature (Rous-
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seau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998). Furthermore, it is possible to trust
only some of the counterpart’s motives, but still be skeptical about others
(McKnight and Chervany 2001). When it comes to interorganizational
trust, this issue is relevant because it is unnecessary to trust every aspect
of the partner (Sydow 1998).
Another aspect of trust is that it is bidirectional. Although there is a
trustor and a trustee, trust goes both ways in a relationship. That is, an
individual is both a trustee and a trustor simultaneously. In the thesis,
this assumption is implicit when considering trust.
At last, trust is socially constructed (Giddens 1990; Grey and Gar-
sten 2001), meaning the social context will determine its specific charac-
ter. Thus, it is different from project to project—an issue being implicit
in this thesis.
As described above, the factors about trust are addressed in the at-
tributes to a large extent which should make them applicable to the GSO
context.
2.2 Attributes of trust
With the above assumptions in mind, this section presents the seven at-
tributes of trust. A discussion of the attributes will help to provide a
better understanding of trust, and develop a conceptual framework to
subsequently analyze the case. By conceptualizing trust by attributes,
the different attributes are interconnected. As a consequence, it is im-
portant to notice that this division is made only for analytical purposes.
That is, attempting to make trust identifiable in the case.
2.2.1 Predictability
One aspect related to trust, is about expectations or contingent outcomes
of a process. Giddens (1990) looks at trust as what comes out of the faith
in predictability. When a person feels he or she can predict another per-
son’s behavior, he is more likely to trust the other person. This predic-
tion can also concern organizations and firms which makes it important
in GSO projects. However, in cases where behavior is predictable, it is
not necessarily the preferred behavior. One example from the context of
GSO could be a company considering outsourcing to well-known pro-
vider of pirate copied software. In such a case, it would probably be
correct to predict that the company would sell your software illegally,
as well. Such a behavior is predictable, but not preferred. Thus, pre-
dictability is value-neutral (McKnight and Chervany 2001). Under such
circumstances, building trust is difficult, of course. Predictability is still
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an important aspect though, because unpredictability presents a risk in
itself (Maguire, Phillips, and Hardy 2001).
Predicting behavior of others, individuals or organizations, is not an
easy task. In the beginning of an outsourcing relationship, when two
parties know each other only a little, prediction is difficult. One way
to increase the ability to predict is to introduce control mechanisms to
make behavior predictable. Another way of predicting behavior, is by ob-
serving patterns of behavior, and expecting them to continue (Maguire,
Phillips, and Hardy 2001). When predicting by observing, the predict-
ability has to come from increased knowledge about the other. In such
cases, the trustor can do little but observe. The trustee, on the other
hand, must be careful and act in a consistent way and avoid any sort
of unexpected behavior. The process of observation is a slow one. It
stems from activity taking place over a period of time, so expecting quick
results from this approach, will probably fail.
Predictability has to do with the competence of another, as well.
McKnight and Chervany (2001) suggest predictability as a way of ad-
dressing the feeling that a person has characteristics beneficial to one.
Before a company engages in a relationship, it will normally try to find
more information about its future partner; its reputation, amount of suc-
cess in previous projects et cetera.
When collecting information about another; a person or an organiz-
ation, the goal is to be able to predict their behavior as precisely as pos-
sible. But since the companies participating in GSO projects are located
at different sites, full information is impossible to get. Thus, the need
for trust is magnified in GSO relationships. What is possible though, is
to know enough about the other part to be able to predict behavior in
a reasonably precise way. Figure 2.1 on the next page shows the con-
nection between degrees of information (predictability) and degrees of
trust. GSO relationships are separated geographically, so high degrees
of information about the partner are difficult to achieve (arrow 3). Fur-
thermore, since trust is more likely to emerge when the partners know
each other well, a low degree of information is not wanted (arrow 1).
Neither is a low degree of trust (arrow 4) because trust is needed in GSO
relationships. At last, a high degree of trust while the predictability is
low is not wanted either (arrow 2). Such a situation could be considered
blind trust (Giddens 1990). However, there are degrees of such blindness
which should be minimized as far as possible. As the figure illustrates,
GSO relationships are squeezed between borders which are not wanted
and/or unlikely to cross. The gray square suggests where GSO projects
most likely and/or most preferably should be.
Brenkert (1998) analyzes the relationship between predictability and
trust, arguing that even when predictability in a relationship is present,
trust does not necessarily appear as a result. On the other hand, there
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are situations where predictability is difficult, but one still has trust. This
view is visualized in figure 2.1 where the two examples are located at
the lower right and upper right corner respectively. In addition, it makes
clear that trust and predictability are not the same which implies that
they can both exist independently. Still, as a more general rule, if one
cannot predict behavior, trust is difficult to build (Brenkert 1998).
Low predictability
while trust is present
Predictability but
low level of trust
GSONot wanted1
2
Unlikely
3
N
ot
 w
an
te
d
4
Degree of trust
N
ot
 w
an
te
d
Predictability
Figure 2.1: The connection between trust and information.
2.2.2 Competence
Competence means having the ability to do for one what one needs done
(McKnight and Chervany 2001). It also includes capacity to learn new
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tasks and technologies (Sahay, Krishna, and Nicholson 2003)1. Compet-
ence is especially important in the GSO context. In many cases, the key
argument for a company to outsource is the lack of competence within
its own organization (Carmel 1999). Such competence may be of differ-
ent kinds though. Technical knowledge is the most obvious in relation
to software development, but other resources are important too. Some
examples are capital, human resources, physical properties, and market
power (Das and Teng 2001).
When being in alliance with a company whose reputation for com-
petence is good, the client will feel more confident about the outcome
of the project. Demonstrating competence takes time though, and pre-
supposes close contact between the trustee and the trustor. This contact
will again increase the understanding between the partners, and compet-
ence trust will be easier to develop. However, in a virtual situation this
process develops slower than in a face-to-face situation (Carmel 1999).
Firms possessing different kinds of competence, often try to build a
reputation based on these advantages. On the other hand, even a com-
petent partner can act opportunistic (Das and Teng 2001), so basing the
project on competence trust alone, is not enough. Sometimes companies
try to demonstrate competence they do not possess. Such behavior, and
its relation with trust, is discussed in section 2.2.7 on page 26.
2.2.3 Structure
The idea of structure as an attribute of trust rests upon the belief that
aspects other than personality are important when building trust: “[. . . ]
one believes the necessary impersonal structures are in place to enable
one to act in anticipation of a successful future endeavor” (Kim and
Prabhakar 2000, p. 538). Examples of such structures are written con-
tracts, reporting mechanisms, and rules for response time on written mes-
sages (Sabherwal 1999). Also, the use standards like ISO 90012 and
CMM3 are considered structural attributes. The key function of these
structures is to enable predictability (Maguire, Phillips, and Hardy 2001).
Structures can be used to increase predictability in at least two ways:
(1) enable monitoring, and (2) influence the behavior of the partner. The
latter function relates to the aspect of control defined as “A regulatory
process by which the elements of a system are made more predictable
1Sahay, Krishna, and Nicholson (2003) use the term “performance-based trust”
defined as “[. . . ] building up confidence with respect to the ability of the partners effect-
ively to carry out the tasks they are supposed to on time and on budget” (Sahay, Krishna,
and Nicholson 2003, p. 252). Since this definition to a large extent concerns competence
as it is understood above, this thesis interprets the two concepts to be identical.
2See www.iso.org.
3See www.sei.cmu.edu.
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through the establishment of standards in the pursuit of some desired
object or state” (Maguire, Phillips, and Hardy 2001, p. 287); (Das and
Teng 2001, p. 258).
Considering predictability as an attribute of trust, and structure as a
way of achieving this, structure also has a downside with respect to trust.
In relationships where the structural mechanisms are either too extens-
ive or too few, trust is difficult to build. While controlling the partner by
using structural mechanisms is possible, it may not be the best way to im-
prove performance. Excessive control from one of the organizations can
actually hurt performance in an outsourcing relationship because much
time has to be spent on reporting and feedback to the controller (Rous-
seau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998). In some relationships, control is
used to find ways to identify how the other organization may have hurt
the project. Excessive control can also be associated with a perception of
a lack of trust. The controlled organization may feel it is not found to be
trustworthy, which again can reduce the degree of trust. Excessive faith
in trust, while ignoring structural mechanisms, may not be good for the
relationship either. If a project is based on the assumption that nobody
acts opportunistically, lack of structure can be negative when problems
arise. Under such conditions, each organization may try to blame the
counterpart, but when there is no formal contract on responsibility, such
a situation can reduce trust. Another example is when there are no rules
for response time when receiving e-mails. If the sender expects a quick
response, and the recipient is slow, the lack of structure may cause irrit-
ation which again can hurt trust in the relationship. On the other hand,
a way to improve the degree of trust in a relationship is by ensuring that
proper structures are present. Because structures enable prediction, but
both excessive and too little control can hurt the project performance, a
balanced degree of structures is preferred.
2.2.4 Calculation
The idea of calculation as a way of building trust stems from the eco-
nomic literature, and refers to the assessment of whether the trustee is
able to perform an action that is beneficial (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and
Camerer 1998; Kim and Prabhakar 2000; Sabherwal 1999). This idea is
further elaborated by Castelfranchi and Falcone (2000, p. 1779): “[. . . ]
several important examples and natural situations of trust would be ex-
cluded without any advantage”. This implies that if there is nothing to
gain from a relationship, it will not take place. Calculation-based trust
appears when the knowledge of the partner is limited: “This form of trust
tends to be strongly associated with the early stages of GSA4 relation-
4Global Software Alliance.
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ship growth, before other forms of trust (performance and identification)
grow” (Sahay, Krishna, and Nicholson 2003, p. 252, footnote added). In
the GSO context this kind of trust has to do, for example, with the pos-
sibility of signing contracts for future projects (Sabherwal 1999). That
is, the software supplier may try to perform well during potential pilot
projects aimed at evaluating the competence of the partner.
When a company decides to participate in an outsourcing relation-
ship, the decision also includes several risks: the business partner in the
relationship may act opportunistically, he or she may not possess the pre-
ferred skills, and economic problems may arise. On the other hand, the
advantages can be big if the project is a success. When deciding whether
to participate in an outsourcing relationship, the company has to com-
pare the potential risks with the possible advantages of the relationship.
Thus, risk is not just a negative notion even if the risk of negative events
should be minimized as far as possible (Giddens 1999). In our lives there
is a balance between avoiding risks and taking them. Inaction is also
risky (Giddens 1990), so in every decision, there is an opportunity part
along with the possible negative outcome. People take risks in a climate
of future opportunities by trying to calculate future risk (Giddens 1999).
A distinction to make is between objective and subjective risk (Das
and Teng 2001). Objective risk is based upon the consequences of differ-
ent alternatives when making a decision. It can sometimes be objectively
calculated, for example the probability of winning in a lottery. Subjective
risk is the decision makers’ estimate of objective risk. Every decision has
both an objective and a subjective risk, but because of complexity and
lack of information, only the latter is possible to determine. Since risk is
associated with uncertainty, the subjective risk is an estimate instead of
a prediction (Giddens 1990; Beck 2000).
2.2.5 Goodwill
Goodwill as a source of trust refers to a general tendency to trust others
(Kramer 1999; Patrick 2002), and has its origin in the psychology dis-
cipline which distinguishes individuals with high and low trusting per-
sonalities (Sydow 1998). Disposition to trust is important because it is
an antecedent for several other kinds of trust (McKnight and Chervany
2001). Because humans have different experiences regarding their rela-
tions to others, these shape the personality with respect to how likely
the individual is to develop trust: “Trust develops during childhood as
infant seeks and receives help from his benevolent care givers, resulting
in a general tendency to trust others” (Kim and Prabhakar 2000, p. 538).
This goodwill may concern any attribute of the other, for example per-
sonal characteristics like honesty and benevolence, but also more general
attributes like competence and predictability (McKnight and Chervany
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2001).
The expectation that others have good intentions with their actions
may also be relevant on other levels than the individual. Even if trust in
organizations, as opposed to trust in individuals, concerns faith in the
correctness of principles more than interaction (Sydow 1998; Giddens
1990), such trust is also dependent on a general goodwill between the
organizations. Moreover, Sydow (1998) suggests that powerful organiz-
ations are more willing to trust then weak ones, and thereby acknow-
ledging a difference in disposition to trust on the organizational level.
2.2.6 Knowledge
Knowledge about the partner(s) in a relationship is seen to be important
when building trust: “trust between two or more interdependent actors
thickens or thins as a function of their cumulative interaction” (Kramer
1999, p. 575). The most important outcome of such interaction is pre-
dictability (see section 2.2.1 on page 20) (Sahay, Krishna, and Nicholson
2003).
It is important to notice that gaining rich knowledge about the part-
ner is difficult to achieve, and emerges only after longer-term interaction
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998). However, Hertzum (2002)
identifies four ways of building knowledge-based trust: first-hand ex-
perience, reputation, surface attributes (e.g. language, clothes and so
on), and stereotypes. Since members of GSO projects are separated geo-
graphically, these ways of building trust must be supported by bringing
together key personnel. Another way is by launching pilot projects (Sab-
herwal 1999), and closely monitoring its progress.
In the beginning of GSO projects, when the knowledge about the
other organization is limited, Sahay, Krishna, and Nicholson (2003, p.
251) suggest the following solution: “Various middlemen, often experi-
enced, well-connected ex-employees can help facilitate and foster rela-
tionships or set up and incubate offshore subsidiaries”. Such people are
able to establish important personal relations between the organizations,
which is important for sharing knowledge.
2.2.7 Betrayal
Since trust is needed when there is an inability to monitor the action of
the trustee—which is the case in GSO projects—means a potential for
risk. One of these risks is the opportunity for violations of the trust. This
is called betrayal, and is defined as “a voluntary violation of mutually
known pivotal expectations of the trustor by the trusted party (trustee),
which has the potential to threaten the well-being of the trustor” (Elan-
govan and Shapiro 1998, p. 548). This definition limits betrayal only
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to consider intentional acts, and hence, excluding accidents, mistakes,
and bad luck. Examples of betrayal are theft, lying, failing to return
a phone call, breach of contract, and broken promises. Even if these
examples are trivial, their consequences may be significant: “negative
(trust-destroying) events are more visible and noticeable than positive
(trust-building) events” (Kramer 1999, p. 593).
Another aspect of betrayal is the motives for such a violation. Elan-
govan and Shapiro (1998) identify several reasons for such behavior to
take place: availability of alternate trustors, the recognition of low pen-
alties, the recognition of large benefit, and, at last, a calculative aspect as
described in section 2.2.4 on page 24.
Although betrayal to a large extent is associated with trust-breaking
behavior, it can also build trust. Because behavior can be predictable but
not preferred (see section 2.2.1 on page 20), not betraying can build trust
in (already established) GSO relationships. That is, if the trustee expects
to be betrayed, not betraying can build trust in the trustor.
2.3 Evaluation of the attributes
The following attributes of trust have been identified: predictability, com-
petence, structure, calculation, goodwill, knowledge, and betrayal. In
order to make the attributes of trust identifiable in the GSO context,
they have to be mutually exclusive. That is, the overlaps between them
should be minimized as far as possible. However, conceptualizing trust
by attributes is made only for analytical purposes. Thus, they are all in-
terconnected to some extent. From the above descriptions, two overlaps
were found to be of larger extent than the rest.
First, predictability and calculation are seen to be quite similar. When
individuals are assessing whether a relationship will be advantageous,
this action includes an element of predicting which connects calculation
and predictability. However, while predictability is a source of trust itself,
calculation-based trust is seen as what comes out of the prediction of
future events. Thus, the two attributes concern different issues of trust
although they overlap to some extent.
Second, competence and knowledge are connected since they both
concern knowledge about characteristics of the partner. Thus, know-
ledge about the partner’s competence is still knowledge. However, com-
petence is especially important in GSO projects, so competence as an
attribute of trust is found to be useful in addition to knowledge in order
to identify trust in GSO relationships.
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2.3.1 Summary
As described above, two overlaps between the attributes of trust are
found. However, despite these overlaps, all the attributes are found to
be necessary in order to identify important aspects of trust in the GSO
context. Thus, removing any of them is seen to make trust less identi-
fiable. As a result, the attributes will all be used to identify trust in the
SalarySystem project.
Furthermore, trust was seen to be multidisciplinary, present within
and between organizations, multilevelled, related to humans and sys-
tems, changing over time, having varying degrees, being bidirectional,
and socially constructed. Since the attributes of trust address all these
factors which were found to be important for the attributes of trust to
have explanatory power in the GSO context, the factors are implicit
when applying the attributes to the findings from the SalarySystem pro-
ject. The following attributes of trust are suggested:
Predictability: Observing characteristics about the partner, and expect-
ing these to continue, is a source of trust. However, in cases where
predictability is possible, the observed characteristics are not ne-
cessarily the preferred ones.
Competence: Competence of different kinds is important in order to
perform successful GSO projects. Such skills might be difficult to
demonstrate because of geographical distance.
Structure: Structural mechanisms include standards, rules for response
time, reporting mechanisms, and written messages. The key func-
tion of these structures is to enable predictability.
Calculation: Calculation means assessing whether a relationship will be
advantageous which includes both associated risks and opportun-
ities.
Goodwill: Goodwill as a source of trust refers to a general tendency to
trust others. Individuals are different with respect to how likely
they will develop trust.
Knowledge: Long-time interaction increases the knowledge about the
partner. This knowledge makes it easier to predict the future.
Betrayal: Opportunistic behavior which threatens the well-being of the
trustor can break trust. If the trustee expects to be betrayed, not
betraying can build trust in the trustor.
Chapter 3
The SalarySystem project
In this chapter, the history of the SalarySystem project is presented in a
chronological way. Some incidents which took place prior to the pro-
ject are considered important for the understanding too, so the project
description starts by introducing these before the rest of the project is
described. Since this thesis discusses issues of trust, the presentation of
the history is focused on trust too. That is, only events considered rel-
evant to discuss in relation to trust are mentioned. This chapter begins
by introducing the two companies in the project and the product being
outsourced.
3.1 The companies
The SalarySystem project took place between a Norwegian customer,
ScanSys, and a Russian software developer, RussCo. The two companies
are described below.
3.1.1 ScanSys
ScanSys is a European-based multinational IT company specialized in
consulting, employing 13 000 people in more than 20 countries. The
SalarySystem project included only the Norwegian department though.
The company develops software solutions for customers, and having an-
nual net sales of e 1.3 billion (in 2002), it is a leading supplier of high
value-added IT services in Europe. In Norway ScanSys has more than
900 employees, but only around 15 people were directly involved in the
ScanSys–RussCo relationship.
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3.1.2 RussCo
RussCo is a software company located in St. Petersburg, Russia. The
company was founded in 1993, and had in 2003 110 employees consist-
ing of 74 software developers, 19 software testers, and 17 administration
personnel. Most of RussCo’s customers are from the United States and
Europe in addition to some from South Africa and Australia. RussCo is a
member of a St. Petersburg-based consortium of information technology
companies aiming at establishing contact with foreign customers.
3.2 The product being outsourced
The computer software SalarySystem is an off-the-shelf system for salary
and human resources management. SalarySystem is designed for small
and middle-sized companies and has 11 000 customers in Norway which
represents a 70% share of the domestic market. The system is used for
several tasks including salary calculation, accounting, and reporting. Ex-
amples of data stored in the system include information about accounts,
employees, and salary types. The system can generate reports from these
data—either via report templates or defined by the user.
The Norwegian tax and salary rules are deeply embedded in Salary-
System, which makes it quite difficult to use even for experienced users.
As an example, a user who calculates the tax of the employees needs
knowledge about the Norwegian tax and salary rules in order to perform
such an operation. Because of this, ScanSys has developed a support
department for SalarySystem users. This department receives more than
2000 phone calls on busy days—an important factor for the success of
the software:
[ScanSys] is not selling a program, but a product. Support is
important; 50% of the value of the product.
— ScanSys developer
The system dates back to 1987, but the ScanSys management found
the version of 2001 to be very difficult to maintain for three reasons.
Firstly, because the Norwegian tax and salary rules are changed at least
once a year, SalarySystem has to be changed constantly in order to be
up-to-date. Over the years, changes have made the quality of the source
code bad, so ScanSys saw the need for a better-structured source code.
Secondly, when the first Delphi version of SalarySystem was written,
the developers themselves learned Delphi during the development phase
which made the source code unprofessional from the beginning. Thirdly,
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in 1999, two years before the SalarySystem project started, all the de-
velopers who had been involved in the development of SalarySystem left
ScanSys, leaving behind little documentation:
A big issue in [ScanSys] is the lack of documentation.
— ScanSys company manager
So to make the required changes, the new developers had to read the
source code in order to understand the system. This process was slow
which was seen as a problem as it was difficult to respond effectively to
the continuous changes.
When ScanSys realized that SalarySystem needed a better-structured
and more flexible source code, they also wanted the programming lan-
guage to be changed from Delphi 3.0 to Delphi 6.0. But still, because of
the strong brand name of SalarySystem and high customer satisfaction,
ScanSys wanted to keep the functionality of the system unchanged. Such
an update of existing software is called re-engineering which is defined
as restructuring or rewriting of parts or whole inherited systems without
changing functionality (Sommerville 2001). Another reason for the re-
engineering was the database of the system. This database was licensed
which was seen as an unnecessary expense by ScanSys considering other
databases were available free of charge. Later in the project, these li-
censes had to be extended for one more year because of the delay in the
project. This resulted in a $77 000 additional expenses for ScanSys. In
addition, the existing database was seen to be slow and unreliable.
For several reasons, the SalarySystem software was distributed on
CDs sent by post. The cost of distributing the CDs to all the SalarySys-
tem customers was 500 000 NOK, which meant that the re-engineered
product had to be free of bugs before it was distributed. This constraint
was difficult to handle in the project and led to further delay because
extensive testing had to be performed.
3.3 Pre-project history: initiating the GSO
When ScanSys found that a re-engineering of SalarySystem was neces-
sary, they made estimates of how much work it would be to upgrade
the system internally in ScanSys, which was approximately three years
of work for one person. The ScanSys general management believed this
was costly, and decided not to develop internally. At that time, Scan-
Sys also lacked internal developers having the right skills to perform the
project. For these two reasons, the company manager decided to explore
other opportunities, and GSO was found to be a possible solution.
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First the ScanSys staff considered different countries. For US com-
panies, India is the number one country to outsource to. 67.7% of the
Indian software export goes to the US (Nasscom 2003). However, prior
to the SalarySystem project, ScanSys had experience from a small GSO
project with India, and they found that time difference and geographical
and cultural distance hampered the project. For these reasons Russia was
chosen instead. Carmel and Agarwal (2001) also identify advantages of
such near shore outsourcing. One such advantage is reduced response
time when using asynchronous communication tools such as e-mail and
ICQ. By the end of the project, ScanSys found that Russia had been a
better experience than the project with India despite the problems that
occurred. The main advantages were seen to be the close cultural and
geographical distance—the European mindset of the Russians was easier
to relate to for the Norwegians as compared to their prior Indian experi-
ence.
After Russia was chosen, the Norwegians went to Russia, and via
the consortium of information technology companies located in the St.
Petersburg area, they had a number of companies recommended. They
visited some of them:
We looked at six or seven companies, and I can tell you there
is a big difference between them both in terms of business
experience and leadership. The premises are often very poor,
the surroundings horrible, and the state of infrastructure bad.
The quality of their theoretical knowledge on the other hand
is high.
— The “Cultural Liaison”
Since ScanSys in Norway is quite small, they looked for a company of
similar size and found RussCo to fit this description. Another reason for
the choice of RussCo was that the company was more “Western” com-
pared to the other companies they visited:
Some of the other companies were very Russian, like the ones
you see on TV. They had a technical focus, and the key people
spoke bad English.
— ScanSys company manager
Also, RussCo was seen to be less hierarchical than the other com-
panies they visited—a difference which was considered positive by the
ScanSys staff:
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The other companies we looked at had one person on top in
a hierarchy. This is similar to how things were during the So-
viet years, when all decisions had to be made at the top level.
When we visited [RussCo], we were introduced not only to
the top manager, but also to people of lower rank.
— ScanSys company manager
Altogether, these factors made the ScanSys staff feel good about Rus-
sCo as a future business partner. In the words of a senior ScanSys man-
ager:
This decision was based on a gut feeling.
— ScanSys company manager
This somehow intangible but strong feeling was also described by a
ScanSys consultant who helped them establish the RussCo relationship:
Was it the smell, the look, the way they talked, the way they
listened, or the feeling of mutual understanding?
— The “Cultural Liaison”
After RussCo was chosen, a pilot project was launched. This project
was divided into smaller phases which could be stopped at any time. The
idea was to try and see if the relationship worked out well.
From the RussCo side, a potential cooperation with ScanSys was
seen to have several advantages. For some time, RussCo had tried to
get into the Scandinavian market. Because most of RussCo’s customers
were located in the US, the company management wanted to increase
the number of countries to cooperate with as a strategy to manage risk,
especially given the slowing down of the North American market from
2000 onwards. Also, Scandinavian customers were seen to pay better
than North American clients. This strategy was seen as a way of being
less vulnerable of economic ups and downs:
You do not put all your eggs in the same basket.
— RussCo general manager
Because of the wish to engage in a business relationship with Scan-
Sys, RussCo tried their best to show their competence and company cul-
ture to the Norwegians.
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3.3.1 The “Cultural Liaison”
In the SalarySystem project, ScanSys used a person who fits the char-
acteristics of a cultural liaison: “The cultural liaison might be a person
who travels back and forth between the key stakeholder sites. The li-
aison’s informal role is to facilitate the cultural, linguistic, and organiza-
tional flow of communication and to bridge cultures, mediate conflicts,
and resolve cultural miscommunications” (Carmel and Agarwal 2001, p.
27). This person described his role in the project in the following way:
I have only been a cultural bridge trying to create the best
atmosphere.
— The “Cultural Liaison”
The “Cultural Liaison” of the SalarySystem project was a Norwegian
with a Russian wife. He had worked in the computer industry since
1969, and had extensive knowledge about Russia. He also spoke Rus-
sian. After ScanSys decided to explore the opportunities of GSO, he
was hired as a consultant aiming to help them establish the contact with
Russian software companies and to understand the Russian way of do-
ing business. During the initial stages, the “Cultural Liaison” attended
meetings in Russia to help the ScanSys company manager act correctly
with the Russians:
[ScanSys] hired [the “Cultural Liaison”] as a “bodyguard” and
consultant. He talked about everything, and I think [ScanSys]
used him to tell them “who is telling the truth”.
— RussCo general manager
The crucial role of the “Cultural Liaison” in establishing and main-
taining the relationship is confirmed by the ScanSys company manager:
Without a local guide I would never have continued to try to
establish a partnership in Russia.
— ScanSys company manager
3.4 History of the SalarySystem project
In this section, the project history is described. To ease the understand-
ing of the project, the history is divided into five parts: the first meet-
ing in Norway, the estimation process, the near-breakdown, the recovery
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phase, and interdependency. This division is made only for analytical
purposes because the events described sometimes took place in several
phases. These phases are schematically shown in figure 3.1 and discussed
below.
in Norway
The first meeting Near−break−
down
The recovery phase
6
Pre−project history The estimation process
Interdependency
Months after project start
−1−2−4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
−3
Figure 3.1: The SalarySystem project phases.
3.4.1 The first meeting in Norway
After RussCo was chosen as the outsourcing partner, two RussCo staff
came to Norway; the project manager and a developer. The latter was
discussed as a very clever developer referred to as the “Delphi Guru”
by his RussCo colleagues. From ScanSys, the project manager and a
Russian-speaking developer participated.
The aim of the meeting, initiated by ScanSys, was to transfer an un-
derstanding of the domain knowledge of SalarySystem as well as learning
to know each other better:
[RussCo] appointed a project leader who came to Norway
for one week to go through the specifications and learn more
about our organization. Also, [the ScanSys staff] should eval-
uate the degree of knowledge and experience of the RussCo
employees.
— The “Cultural Liaison”
The Norwegian project manager was initially skeptical about the de-
cision to outsource SalarySystem—he found it hard to believe that an
external development team would be able to perform a successful pro-
ject. As the meeting continued, he changed his mind:
They were very persuasive, so I was convinced that they could
do the job. What persuaded me was that the Russians came
up with the same solutions as we wanted. I went from being
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negative to become positive towards cooperating with [Rus-
sCo].
— ScanSys project manager
The focus of the discussions was primarily technical, considering the
database structure, when to use Delphi standard components et cetera.
They looked at the documents describing the new system that the project
manager had made, and the Russians had the details explained. These
details were explained by the ScanSys Russian-speaking developer—in
Russian. Because of this, the ScanSys project manager was not act-
ively involved in the discussion which further amplified the technical
approach of the discussions. On the other hand, the use of the Russian
language made the technical details easier to understand for the Russi-
ans.
The documentation about SalarySystem was to a large extent written
in Norwegian. Even the source code had comments, class names, vari-
able names, database fields, and tables written in Norwegian. During the
meeting, the decision was made to use Norwegian in the source code of
the new system too. The reason for this decision was to maintain con-
sistency between the old and new versions of SalarySystem. Because the
two versions would be used simultaneously for a period, this decision
was found to be necessary. As a result of these issues, the amount of
documentation the Russians got was necessarily limited and difficult to
understand. The information they had on the business logic was limited
too. After the meeting the Russians brought the 15 Mb source code, an
installation guide, the SalarySystem manual, a picture of the database
structure drawn from the whiteboard drawn by one of the ScanSys staff,
and a running version of the system back to Russia. Most of this was
written in Norwegian.
Initially in the project, the ScanSys staff was aware of the business lo-
gic encapsulated into SalarySystem. For one part of the system, the cal-
culation engine, the need for understanding the business logic is crucial.
This part calculates taxes, salaries et cetera using the Norwegian tax and
salary rules. Because of this need for domain knowledge, the decision
was made to develop this part of the system in Norway. Furthermore,
ScanSys assumed that the rest of the system would be less dependent
on the business logic knowledge, an assumption subsequently proved
wrong. During the autumn of 2001, RussCo spent a lot of time trying
to understand SalarySystem from the information they got. It proved
to be difficult to find out all about the business logic because they had
little information, and what they had was written Norwegian. They pre-
pared questions and tried to create prototypes, but they could not see
the business logic. If the Russians had questions, they collected them
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and sent an e-mail to Norway. They got some more information this way,
but sometimes the Norwegians did not have the answer either since the
developers in charge had not been involved in the development of the
system.
The starting point of the project was limited to a technical focus, and
that too was rather thin in the absence of any formal documentation.
This problem was compounded by the fact that when the project man-
ager returned to Russia after the meeting in Norway, he spent only about
10% of his time on the SalarySystem project. The rest of his time was
spent on other projects that RussCo was involved in with other custom-
ers. The “Delphi Guru” was also shortly after the meeting moved by
RussCo to another project, and was for the next six months or so not
involved with SalarySystem. The little domain knowledge that had been
transferred to RussCo through the meeting in Norway was thus further
dwindled by the reassignment of these two key project staff—something
that was not explicitly known to ScanSys.
An implication of the poor knowledge transfer was that one of the
Russian developers spent one month working on a technical solution
that turned out to be wrong. The misunderstanding concerned whether
the interface of the system should be stored in the database, or gener-
ated from a common GUI1 framework. Unfortunately, she worked on
the wrong solution for one month before this misunderstanding was dis-
covered because no one was there to clarify her work.
Once the RussCo general management realized that the project was
running into problems, more people were assigned. The first two months
of the project the project team consisted of two developers in addition
to the project manager. Two months later they had grown to five people
before they ended up at ten developers six months after the project start.
But even if these adjustments were made, the performance of the project
was low.
3.4.2 The estimation process
After the meeting in Norway, the Russians started to make estimates
about the re-engineering of SalarySystem. RussCo estimated to finish the
project in six months, using 642 person-days (see figure 3.2 on page 39).
14 months after project start, when the project was about to be finished,
RussCo had used 3600 person-days. Since the project estimates were
about six times under the actual amount of work, it suggests the estima-
tion process was problematic. However, the RussCo estimates were also
confirmed by ScanSys who earlier had made approximately the same es-
timates internally. But because ScanSys wanted RussCo to make estim-
1Graphical User Interface.
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ates independently of the ScanSys estimates, ScanSys did not give them
to RussCo during the first meeting in Norway. Later, the RussCo general
manager said:
We may be stupid, but both sides made bad estimates.
— RussCo general manager
Despite the limited understanding of the system, the Russians started
making estimates about the amount of work to re-engineer the system.
Firstly, an attempt was made to estimate the system based on “lines of
code”. This method, described by Jørgensen (2001), is to prepare estim-
ates based on lines of source code. There are around 300 000 lines of
source code in the old SalarySystem, but the estimate was seen to be
too high and abandoned. RussCo found this approach inappropriate be-
cause they found that since parts of the old code were not being used,
the re-engineered source code would consist of less program lines. Also,
since change of the database was one of the key issues of the project, the
RussCo analysts did not assume the number of source code lines would
be comparable in the old and the new system. Later, the following es-
timation process was adopted: First the project members looked at the
source code and the running version of the system, and tried to trace the
structure and functionality of the system. Then the Russian project man-
ager asked the project members how much time they needed to develop
different parts of the system like forms, tables and so on. Afterwards they
counted these items, summed up, and assumed that each of these items
would take a given number of days to develop. At last, they estimated
1/3rd in addition for testing. These estimates were sent to Oslo where
they were compared with the ScanSys estimates, and it was concluded
by the project manager that the estimates were generally okay.
The RussCo estimates of work to complete the SalarySystem pro-
ject are shown in figure 3.2. These estimates, divided into six stages,
are mostly concerned with system implementation. System analysis—
including understanding of the domain knowledge—is emphasized less.
However, the estimate called “Business logic overview” in stage 1 con-
cerns analysis as well as “Software Requirement Specification – draft”
and “Software Requirement Specification” from stage 2. Altogether, the
three estimates add up to 75 person-days of analysis out of a total of 642
person-days for the whole project. Consequently, since only these parts
of the estimates concerned system analysis, the 75 person-days would
have to include both language training and understanding the business
logic of the system. However, these two parts of the project turned out
to be very time-consuming:
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All additional time was spent trying to understand the busi-
ness logic of the system. The business logic was not under-
stood, and we did not see the complexity of the project. We
did not understand the usage of [SalarySystem]. No time was
estimated for translation.
— RussCo developer I
Figure 3.2: The RussCo estimates.
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Another reason for the wrong estimates had to do with the contract
of the project. This contract was signed after the estimates were made
because it was supposed to be based on these. That is, the price Scan-
Sys was supposed to pay for the re-engineering of SalarySystem would
be based on the estimated amount of work to finish the project. And
because ScanSys would be reluctant to sign the contract if the price was
high, RussCo decided to make low estimates:
It was a point to make low estimates in order to get the con-
tract.
— Former RussCo project manager
Through the SalarySystem project, RussCo reported the progress of
the project to ScanSys on a weekly basis. In the estimation phase of
the project, the reports from RussCo indicated that the project was going
well, with no untoward problems. These reports were seen by ScanSys
to be correct, and no cross verification was made by the ScanSys project
staff:
It was reported that there was no problem, [the ScanSys pro-
ject manager] did not have any reason to check more thor-
oughly.
— ScanSys company manager
Later, when the project almost failed, these reports were seen to have
been incorrect and provided a misleading picture of the project progress.
3.4.3 The near-breakdown
Five months after project start the staff at ScanSys was not pleased with
the project. The software deliveries from RussCo contained lots of bugs,
screens were without all the requested functionality, and several import-
ant modules were missing. These factors made it impossible to test the
system as a whole because the Norwegians did not have access to all the
necessary modules. ScanSys contacted RussCo and asked critical ques-
tions, indicating that the project was delayed. The Russians did not agree
though, but claimed that everything was on schedule. Then ScanSys was
told that the project was three weeks late, and after two more weeks Rus-
sCo requested six more months to finish the project. That message made
the Norwegians go to Russia, and the two companies had a hard con-
frontation. ScanSys blamed RussCo for the delay, and RussCo had no
arguments against this. The RussCo project manager was then asked to
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come in, and he was blamed for the delay and removed as project man-
ager in front of the Norwegians. The ScanSys staff was surprised by this
episode:
It was a hard situation. We are not used to it in Norway.
— ScanSys project manager
Later the project manager quit RussCo. He did so because he was
moved from the development department to the marketing department,
and understood he had no future in the company. During the meeting,
the Russians offered to finish the project without being paid for addi-
tional time:
We added more people to the project, and ran it on the “com-
pany pocket”.
— RussCo general manager
One of the additional staff who was put full-time on the project, was
the “Delphi Guru”. He possessed both domain and technical knowledge
necessary in order to finish the project.
3.4.4 The recovery phase
Prior to the near-breakdown of the project, the software deliveries from
RussCo contained lots of bugs, but the Russians found it difficult to
identify them because they did not understand how SalarySystem was
used by the end users. Later, when ScanSys understood that RussCo
lacked the appropriate understanding of SalarySystem even if they had
all available written documentation about the system, they offered to
make test cases. Each of the around 15 test cases describes a scenario
or operation in SalarySystem considered difficult. The test cases are de-
scribed in section 4.6 on page 78.
Another change in the project was the introduction of TestTool; an
application which helps organizing the development of software pro-
jects. The use of TestTool had several advantages. One example is that it
made the Norwegians more able to understand the Russians’ problems,
another that the status reporting from Russia improved. TestTool is de-
scribed in section 4.5 on page 63.
Three months after the near-breakdown, three ScanSys staff; the pro-
ject manager, the test coordinator, and a developer went to Russia. This
meeting took place nine months after project start, and was very useful
for the Russians:
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The Russians almost attacked me with lots of questions about
how the product was supposed to be. Then I had to ensure
them I was there to help them. After a while we could start to
sort out the problems.
— ScanSys test coordinator
During the meeting, the Norwegians explained details about Salary-
System and the Norwegian tax and salary rules which the Russians did
not understand. In addition to the Russians’ increased understanding of
SalarySystem, the meeting also had other advantages:
Before I went to Russia, all the different names were the same
person to me. I could not tell them apart. I think we should
have met before and had a party. When you know the people
from the other site, you are not too “pushy”. Instead of being
in doubt whether they are able to finish the job, you think it is
okay. They will surely fix it. You are stricter with people you
don’t know, and more relaxed with people you know.
— ScanSys test coordinator
Through the meeting, the Russians came to understand more about
the calculation engine being developed in Norway, the ScanSys test co-
ordinator educated the testers, and the ScanSys project manager told
them what parts of the project that was most important to finish. Both
in Norway and Russia, the meeting was considered very positive. It was
also generally agreed upon that the meeting took place too late in the
project:
If this kind of meeting had been held earlier in the project, it
would have changed the project dramatically.
— The “Delphi Guru”
After this meeting, more face-to-face meetings took place both in Nor-
way and Russia. Also, ICQ2 was installed in order to provide answers to
short questions from the Russians. But even if the test cases, the in-
troduction of TestTool, more frequent meetings, and ICQ improved the
project performance, there were still problems in the project—generally
related to lack of understanding of SalarySystem. 14 months after project
start one of the project staff said:
2ICQ is an instant messenger. See www.icq.com.
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Even this week we have learned new features.
— RussCo project member
At that time, the system still did not cover all functionality; some parts
were still under implementation. The severity of the problems was little
though.
3.4.5 Interdependency
When the project started, ScanSys were in a position of strength since
they had several software companies to choose from while RussCo was
the “weak part”. The contract of the project, signed two months after
project start, illustrates this. According to this contract, the project was
divided into eight phases where the eighth phase was delivery of the pilot
version. Each phase had a maximum number of man hours, and if this
work amount was exceeded, RussCo had to pay for the rest of the phase.
If the job was completed in less time, the unused man-hours could be
carried over to the next phase. Also, both companies had the possibility
to stop the project after any finished phase. 14 months after project start,
when the amount of work had exceeded the estimates by more than six
times, the project was still in phase seven. ScanSys then had the choice
of stopping the project after the seventh phase, and thereby getting the
SalarySystem software at low cost. However, ScanSys got more and more
dependent on RussCo as the project moved on, and needed RussCo to
develop the software:
If the testing fails, I have no option.
— ScanSys project manager
Because of knowledge sharing and RussCo’s clever developers, Scan-
Sys realized the value of the RussCo relationship. This understanding
made ScanSys decide to finish phase eight internally, but still pay RussCo
$14 000 according to the contract. That was possible because the phase
was mainly concerned with testing; a job ScanSys could do in Norway.
The ScanSys company manager said the following about this decision:
The $14 000 is meant as a compensation for the already ex-
ceeded amount of work. What [ScanSys] gain is future co-
operation.
— ScanSys company manager
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Because of ScanSys’ dependency on RussCo, the ScanSys general
management felt they had to act this way in order to ensure the success
of possible future projects with RussCo.
By the end of the SalarySystem project, new GSO projects between
ScanSys and RussCo were launched. As a result of the willingness to ac-
knowledge and admit to the previous problems, and learning from these
experiences, the project had become advantageous for both companies.
Chapter 4
Trust in the SalarySystem
project
In this chapter, the attributes of trust are applied to the findings from the
SalarySystem project. This analysis considers the project in a chronolo-
gical way, based upon the structure from chapter 3. This is done to be
able to look at trust as a process which develops over time.
4.1 Preconditions
When ScanSys decided to outsource the development of the new Sa-
larySystem to Russia, the decision was made for two reasons: ScanSys
needed the software to be developed at a low cost, and the company
lacked Delphi developers inside its organization. Yet, other factors were
considered too. Geographical distance in GSO relationships was one of
the issues being discussed. However, since the difference in time zones
between Norway and Russia is only two hours, this problem was not
considered important by the ScanSys general management. The close
temporal distance was actually one of the main reasons for the choice
of Russia instead of more distant countries like India and China. Other
problems associated with GSO relationships like issues of communica-
tion, knowledge sharing, project management, coordination, and travel
costs were also taken into consideration by the ScanSys general manage-
ment. Nevertheless, after having estimated a management overhead at
about 30%, they still found that GSO was cost saving.
Although the general strategy for growth at ScanSys was through ac-
quisitions of existing companies, this strategy was seen to be too risky be-
cause of the substantial investments required. Instead they found “direct
outsourcing to supplier firms” to be a more appropriate strategy because
less investments had to be made.
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Even if Russia had the fifth highest software piracy rate worldwide
in 2001 (Business Software Association 2002), ScanSys did not worry
about that. They found SalarySystem only to be useful inside Norway
because of the embedded Norwegian tax and salary rules:
The old source code is badly written and has no value outside
Norway because of the tax rules.
— ScanSys developer
Thus, the risk of piracy was considered irrelevant.
4.1.1 Trust in GSO as a phenomenon
In accordance with the above description, the ScanSys general man-
agement had a positive attitude towards GSO during this time. This
thesis interprets that attitude to be calculation-based trust since ScanSys
found the associated risks to be suppressed by the opportunities of GSO.
Thus, a GSO project was considered an opportunity. However, since the
ScanSys–RussCo relationship was not yet established, there was no one
to trust—neither individuals nor organizations. Thus, the trust at that
time is seen to be in GSO as an advantageous phenomenon. Further-
more, since the SalarySystem project later ran into problems and was
delayed by more than a year—partly because of issues not considered
important by ScanSys—this thesis finds the 30% management overhead
to be too optimistic on behalf of GSO projects. Consequently, the estim-
ated risk that ScanSys associated with GSO deviated from the objective
risk.
Although ScanSys had limited experience in outsourcing, their faith
in GSO was relatively strong. However, since knowledge-based trust can
stem from other sources than first-hand experience, it is reasonably to
believe that their knowledge came from other channels. In turn, this
knowledge was important for the Norwegians’ feeling of predictability
about the future GSO project. Later, when the Norwegians visited Rus-
sCo for the first time, the positive expectations they had about GSO as a
phenomenon resulted in a positive attitude towards RussCo.
4.2 The choice of RussCo
After Russia was chosen as the country to outsource to, some people
from the ScanSys general management went to Russia to look for their
future business partner. Their most important criteria were the company
had to be of similar size as ScanSys and having a Western organization
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style. The latter included the company being not too hierarchical. Rus-
sCo fulfilled these criteria to a large extent. In general, the Norwegians
may be seen to look for a company similar to ScanSys. In this thesis,
this wish is interpreted as a way of predicting the outcome of the pro-
ject in a better way. According to the attribute of trust called knowledge,
knowledge-based trust can be built as a result of first-hand experience,
reputation, surface attributes, and stereotypes. When an individual re-
cognizes characteristics of another which he or she is familiar with, a
feeling of predictability may appear more likely compared to situations
where everything is new. For instance, after visiting Moscow when look-
ing for a company, the ScanSys staff found the city to be larger and more
crowded compared to Norwegian cities. And even if St. Petersburg to
some extent shares these characteristics, the Norwegians found the city
to be more similar with their prior experiences:
Compared to Moscow, I felt more at home in St. Petersburg.
— ScanSys company manager
Thus, feeling “at home” was important in order to predict the new
situation. So, when the Norwegians visited RussCo and found charac-
teristics they could relate to in a positive way, this thesis interprets this
gut feeling as knowledge-based trust. Though, other attributes of trust
were important too.
Believing that recognizable characteristics are beneficial also has to
do with goodwill-trust. This attribute of trust identifies the general tend-
ency to trust others to be important for how likely an individual will
feel good about others. Thus, when the Norwegians felt good because
RussCo was seen to have a Western organization style, this thesis sug-
gests the Norwegians’ general tendency to trust others was important for
this feeling to appear. Furthermore, during this early phase of the rela-
tionship, ScanSys was the strong part meaning they were operating in a
buyer’s market. They could choose from a number of software supplier
companies and demand what the pilot contract should look like. Be-
cause of this strong position, it might have been easier to trust RussCo
(See section 2.2.5 on page 25).
The pilot project that preceded the SalarySystem project, were im-
portant in order to build competence-based trust. However, the import-
ance of competence-based trust is discussed in more detail in section 4.3
on page 49.
4.2.1 The “Cultural Liaison”
The “Cultural Liaison” was important when the ScanSys general man-
agement had to choose among the different software suppliers in Russia.
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His proximity to Russia regarding knowledge of language and culture,
enabled him to help the Norwegians decide what companies would be
able to perform the SalarySystem project. For instance, he knew some of
companies which had an inadequate information infrastructure or were
notorious sellers of pirate copied software. Furthermore, his proximity
to Russia made him more capable to interact and learn about the com-
panies they visited compared to the Norwegians, even if they were all in
the same room. For instance, some of the Russians spoke English poorly,
so he could use his Russian language to improve the communication. In
turn, he could pass on his impressions to the Norwegians. As a result,
his presence was important for the Norwegians’ degree of competence-
based trust. Thus, the assumption that the ScanSys general management
trusted the “Cultural Liaison” is implicit in this interpretation.
Another important role of the “Cultural Liaison”, was helping the
Norwegians act appropriate in Russia. Because of differences between
the two countries with respect to ways of doing business, he was use-
ful for teaching them how to deal with these differences. For instance,
drinking alcohol at business meetings is accepted in Russia which is not
the case in Norway. Also, Russia has a black economy existing in parallel
with the legal part. These differences were difficult to handle for the in-
experienced Norwegians, so the “Cultural Liaison” was helpful in telling
them how to behave. Since the Norwegians to a larger extent behaved as
anticipated, it was easier for the Russians to build knowledge-based trust
in them. Thus, the “Cultural Liaison” was helpful in building trust both
in Norway and Russia.
4.2.2 Trust in Russia
During the early phases of the project—at the time ScanSys visited Rus-
sCo for the first time—this thesis suggests that RussCo got a strong cal-
culation-based trust in ScanSys as a future customer. This interpreta-
tion stems from several circumstances. Prior to the SalarySystem pro-
ject, RussCo had experienced problems in getting new customers. When
RussCo in 1995 joined a software seminar in Finland in order to estab-
lish contacts with potential new customers, the RussCo general manager
described this effort as follows:
After my presentation, many participants wanted to give me
projects, but that was only words.
— RussCo general manager
More specific, RussCo wanted to get into the Scandinavian market
because of mixed experiences with some of their customers from the US:
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It is hard to work with the Americans. They move fast and
want everything now.
— RussCo general manager
In contrast, Scandinavians were seen to prefer long-term relation-
ships. Also, the close cultural and geographical distance was considered
beneficial:
It is nice to work with Scandinavians because we both speak
the same broken English, and not as fast as the Americans.
Finland, Russia, and Norway are more alike.
— RussCo general manager
Furthermore, because of this strong wish to engage in the project
with ScanSys, other kinds of trust seem to have been suppressed at Rus-
sCo. Compared to the ScanSys staff, whose trust came from a number
of different sources like learning to know their future business partner
better and launching pilot projects, the RussCo general management felt
good about the project solely because of the calculation-based trust. This
strong degree of trust was also present during the near-breakdown phase.
When ScanSys blamed RussCo for the slow progress in the project, the
RussCo general management agreed to finish the project without being
paid for additional time. However, the interaction that had taken place
since the beginning of the SalarySystem project suggests that attributes
like predictability and knowledge were also present to some extent.
4.3 The first meeting
The first meeting in Norway took place two months before the SalarySys-
tem project started. During the meeting, several aspects related to trust
came into play.
4.3.1 Trust in Norway
From the Norwegian point of view, the purpose of the first meeting was
to transfer knowledge about SalarySystem and its domain from Norway
to Russia as well as learning more about RussCo’s competence as a soft-
ware supplier. Using the attributes of trust to explain these purposes, the
meeting would be useful to build competence-based trust in the Russi-
ans. Furthermore, the meeting was also supposed to build knowledge-
based trust since the intention was to learn more about the Russians.
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As the meeting went by, the Norwegians were impressed by the Rus-
sians’ skills—especially those of the “Delphi Guru”. Also, when the Nor-
wegians explained details about SalarySystem, they felt that the Russians
better understood what the project was about. They were convinced that
the Russians would be able to do the job, so competence-based trust was
built. When it comes to knowledge-based trust, the description of the
knowledge attribute suggests that interaction itself is a source of trust.
Although the results from the case study not specifically address the ad-
vantages from the first meeting, one of the ScanSys staff described the
problem of lack of knowledge in a more general way:
A problem related to distance is that before you meet the other
team, you cannot imagine their faces.
— ScanSys test coordinator
Based on this statement, this thesis suggests that knowledge-based
trust was built during the first meeting because of the interaction that
took place.
Considering goodwill trust as a reason for this high degree of trust,
the Norwegians in the SalarySystem project may be seen to have had a
general tendency to trust others. On the other hand, because ScanSys
was the strong part in the relationship during this phase of the project,
it might have made them more likely to trust the Russians’ competence
as mentioned earlier. Another reason might have been that the Norwe-
gians themselves did not realize what skills were needed to perform the
SalarySystem project. By the end of the project, the ScanSys company
manager said:
Looking back, the SalarySystem project was much more com-
plicated than we knew. We knew what we wanted, but did not
realize the complexity.
— ScanSys company manager
Since the project later ran into problems while the Norwegians did
not understand why, their predictability about the Russians is seen to
have been low in the beginning of the project. Still, the Norwegians’ de-
gree of trust was high. Thus, there was a difference between their degree
of trust and the Russians’ ability to perform the SalarySystem project,
so trust and predictability are not the same. This situation where the
Russians’ ability to perform the project deviated from the Norwegians’
predictions is illustrated in figure 4.1 on the facing page. It is import-
ant to notice that the figure only considers the predictability attribute of
trust.
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Figure 4.1: The Norwegians’ trust was high compared to their predictab-
ility.
A possible betrayal
After the return to Russia, the project manager and the “Delphi Guru”
spent most of their time on other projects, so their knowledge about Sa-
larySystem was not adequately shared with the rest of the Russian project
members as assumed by the Norwegians. Thus, the Norwegians’ expect-
ations about the Russians were violated. According to the definition of
betrayal, the violation of the Norwegians’ well-being also had to be vol-
untary. However, considering the strong Russian calculation-based trust
during this phase of the project, betraying the Norwegians would not be
beneficial. Instead, this thesis identifies inadequate internal communic-
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ation at RussCo as a reason that might explain the reassignment of the
two RussCo staff. Since the Russians lacked understanding of the Sa-
larySystem project, they failed to see the complexity too. Later, when
the project manager realized the project was running into problems, he
requested more people from the RussCo general management. Unfortu-
nately, he did not succeed in making them understand the seriousness of
the problems:
I asked [the RussCo general manager] to give me more people,
but I only got [RussCo developer IV]. My mistake was that I
was not strong enough.
— Former RussCo project manager
This inadequate internal communication at RussCo was also con-
firmed by the general manager:
[Five months after project start] we picked up the project that
was near a failure.
— RussCo general manager
When the RussCo general management during the near-breakdown
phase realized the project needed more manpower, more people—in-
cluding the “Delphi Guru”—was assigned to the project. As a result of
the above interpretation, the RussCo staff cannot be said to have volun-
tarily intended to betray the Norwegians by allocating too few people to
the SalarySystem project. Instead, the poor internal communication at
RussCo is seen to have been the reason.
4.3.2 Trust in Russia
During the early phases of the project, the Russians had a strong calcu-
lation-based trust in the Norwegians because they wanted the contract
of the SalarySystem project. As a result, they wanted ScanSys to look
upon RussCo as a competent software supplier. In this thesis, the role of
the “Delphi Guru” is interpreted to be a way of demonstrating such com-
petence. During the meeting, his job was to learn about SalarySystem,
and—by suggesting how to develop the new system—demonstrate Rus-
sCo’s competence as a software supplier. Furthermore, after the meeting
in Norway, he was reassigned to other projects. Hence, this interpreta-
tion is based upon the assumption that it would have been better for the
project if his recently obtained knowledge about SalarySystem had been
available for the other Russian project members. This view was later con-
firmed by the “Delphi Guru” himself when discussing the evaluation of
the estimates of the SalarySystem project:
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I did not see the estimates when they were finished. If I had
seen them, I might have been able to identify the problem.
— The “Delphi Guru”
The two RussCo staff who joined the meeting in Norway, had Salary-
System and its domain knowledge explained by the Norwegians. During
the meeting, the Russians increased their knowledge about the project,
but the information they brought back was not very extensive. Further-
more, the Russians asked questions the Norwegians could not answer
later on in the project. As a result, the Russians started to doubt the Nor-
wegians’ knowledge about the project. The assumption that the poor
Norwegian domain knowledge could complicate the SalarySystem pro-
ject was not considered when RussCo after the return to Russia made the
estimates. Thus, the Russians’ strong calculation-based trust might have
made the low degree of competence-based trust less important.
4.4 The estimation process
Several aspects related to trust came into play during the estimation pro-
cess. In this thesis, issues concerning the Software Requirements Spe-
cification, or SRS, are seen to illustrate some of these aspects. At this
stage of the SalarySystem project, the contract was not signed yet, and
the Russians lacked the appropriate understanding of the product. For
these reasons, the Russians wanted to show their competence to increase
their chance of having the SalarySystem contract signed as well as fu-
ture contracts, and they made the SRS. The Russians made the SRS by
looking at the running version of SalarySystem and analyzing the source
code. When the Norwegians got the document, they were impressed by
its size and level of technical detail. But when they later—during the
near-breakdown phase—found that the Russians lacked the appropriate
understanding they were believed to have according to the SRS, the de-
gree of trust in the Russians decreased. The SRS is described below.
4.4.1 Contents of the SRS
The SRS consists of three main parts in addition to the introduction:
a workflow description, a section describing the reports, and at last a
database description. These three parts will all be described in detail
below in the sequence they appear in the SRS.
The structure of the SRS, and especially the introduction, is partly
based on the IEEE standard 830-19981 (IEEE Std 830-1998 1998). This
1The title of the standard is “IEEE recommended practice for software requirements
specifications”.
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standard recommends what an SRS should look like regarding contents
and issues to be addressed. However, apart from the chapter headings,
the SRS does not follow the standard to a large extent. IEEE Std 830-
1998 (1998, p. 3) identifies five issues an SRS should address: func-
tionality, external interfaces, performance, attributes, and design con-
straints imposed on an implementation. Regarding functionality, the
GUI of the old SalarySystem is specified using several flow diagrams.
Also, the reporting function of the system is specified with respect to
what fields to report from, and how to filter the data. When it comes to
the next three issues; external interfaces, performance, and attributes,
none of them are addressed. One feature of SalarySystem is the ability
to export several reports and templates into Microsoft Word or Excel,
but this feature is not mentioned in the SRS. The design constraints im-
posed on an implementation are addressed because both the choice of
programming language and database solution are specified. The con-
nections between the IEEE standard and the SRS are summarized in
table 4.1.
Issue to be addressed Addressed in the SRS
Functionality  The GUI is specified using flow dia-
grams
 The report function is specified
External interfaces  Not addressed
Performance  Not addressed
Attributes  Not addressed
Design constraints imposed
on an implementation
 Programming language and data-
base solution are specified
Table 4.1: Basic issues recommended for an SRS, and how these issues
are addressed in the SRS of the SalarySystem project.
Workflow description
The first part of the SRS considers the workflow of the system which is
to a large extent described using flow diagrams. Every step a user has to
perform is described within a box, and the boxes are connected with ar-
rows. Also, some of these boxes have additional information attached to
them in a tag. Such additional information may concern details about the
workflow not directly connected to the use of the system, but rather the
function of the system on a lower level, for example details of a certain
function in the source code. The diagrams go through a GUI, or a group
of connected GUIs, and describe how to perform a certain task from a
4.4. THE ESTIMATION PROCESS 55
user’s perspective. That is, one diagram shows one function which may
consist of several GUIs. The descriptions contain details about how to
navigate through the GUIs, what buttons to press, where to fill in val-
ues, and what boxes to check. The diagram does also, to some extent,
show which alternatives are possible for a given operation. Figure 4.2 on
the following page shows a diagram from the SRS about how the payroll
calculation is being performed. Figure 4.3 on page 57 is from Salary-
System, and shows the main GUI of the payroll calculation described in
figure 4.2. The GUI contains some boxes and buttons, each providing a
specific functionality for the user. The workflow diagram describes the
functionality of all the GUIs related to payroll calculation.
The workflow diagram in figure 4.2 is the only information in the SRS
about how to perform a payroll calculation, but since this functionality
consists of other features too, the description of the payroll calculation
may be considered incomplete. For example, if the value of the field
“Skatt”2 is set to another value than “Normal Skatt”3, another function-
ality, and another workflow, would appear. Because of the Norwegian
tax and salary rules, such new GUIs appear in SalarySystem only when
specific values and functionalities are chosen. This implies that the user
has to be quite skilled to be able to access these GUIs. And because the
Russians did not possess this knowledge, they found it hard and time
consuming to find all the “hidden” GUIs. So even if the SRS was correct
considering the functionality actually described, it failed to describe all
the functionality in SalarySystem. Also, the workflow description was
incomplete concerning what levels of SalarySystem it concerned, mean-
ing every step from the database up to the GUI. Because only the GUI
is interpreted, a thorough description of what happens at the database
level, at the function level et cetera is missing. In the third part of the
SRS the database tables are described. However, the two parts describ-
ing the workflow and the database are not connected in the SRS, and so
there are no connections between these levels either.
Reports
SalarySystem has around 150 templates for different reports and statistics
to be generated from its database. Examples of some standard reports
include addresses of the employees, salary types, absence from work,
and lists of creditors. There also exists a report generator where the user
can design his or her own reports, but this module is not a part of the
standard SalarySystem. It has to be bought in addition to the standard
version. However, this feature was a part of the redesign, but it is not
2English: Tax.
3English: Normal Tax.
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Figure 4.2: The workflow of the payroll calculation form.
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Figure 4.3: The payroll calculation form from SalarySystem—first part.
described in detail in the SRS. One reason for this, is that it is a relatively
stand-alone module. And because the project was delayed, this feature
was postponed to the end of the project and consequently not considered
in detail in the SRS.
The second part of the SRS describes the standard reports. These
are interpreted by a written description and a table showing the fields
of the report in addition to the filters. The filters determine what values
to be queried from the database. Also, the filters are used for specifying
how to sort the data in the finished report. Figure 4.4 on the following
page is an example of such a report description. This particular report
concerns Svalbardskatt4 which means tax being paid by persons living at
Svalbard. As figure 4.4 shows, the fields in the report are given as well
as their English translation. In other report descriptions in the SRS, the
“Description” field is used for mentioning the valid values of the field. In
the second part of the table, the query alternatives are described.
The reports were described by looking at the interface of SalarySys-
tem, and they cover the functionality to a large extent. However, only
2/3rd of the 150 reports are described in the SRS. So even if the described
reports are correct, the SRS is incomplete considering the reports.
Although it was important to describe the GUI in order to develop
4English: Svalbard tax. According to the Norwegian tax and salary rules, the tax in
Svalbard is different from the tax in other regions of Norway.
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Figure 4.4: The description of the report for Svalbardskatt.
the correct reports, the SRS lacks descriptions of what happens at other
levels of the system. Because the data in the reports are collected from
different tables of the database, the Russians had problems finding the
data. A Russian developer responsible for the reports said:
One challenge was to know where to get the data from.
— RussCo developer II
Another reason for this problem was the fact that all database fields,
tables et cetera in the old source code were written in Norwegian. In
the initial phase of the project, ScanSys and RussCo decided to continue
using Norwegian in the source code of the redesign product too. This
was done to maintain consistency between the old and the new system.
Because these fields and tables are usually recognizable from their name,
it hampered the Russians’ understanding of the system. One of the de-
velopers found the language issue crucial, so she bought herself a book
called something like “Norwegian for Beginners” to learn Norwegian.
This way, she hoped to address the language problem. The language is-
sue is also reflected in the SRS where the field names are translated into
English in the “Description” field (see figure 4.4). Also, the business lo-
gic encapsulated into the source code made the Russians struggle even
harder to understand the working of the system:
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There are about 150 reports in SalarySystem, and 50% of
them are difficult to understand.
— RussCo developer II
Database tables
The last part of the SRS document is a description of the SalarySystem
database. The description consists of 72 tables similar to figure 4.5. First
there is a short written description about the purpose of the table. Then
the database table itself is described by its field names and the corres-
ponding types and comments. The “Comments” field is used for describ-
ing which field in the table is the unique identifier of the table, what
values are allowed in the field, and what function the field has in the
system. One example of the latter is “Car’s model”.
Figure 4.5: The SalarySystem database table for firmabiler (English: com-
pany cars).
The database tables are described one by one, leaving out the connec-
tions between them. However, one exception is that some tables have a
text like “Client’s ID, link to the Firma table.” connected to them. These
kinds of descriptions are limited to only a few tables though. Also, all
key attributes in the tables have the comment “Unique ID, identity”, so
the database schema would be possible to draw using the information
already in place. However, the fact that the connections between the
different tables in the database was not explicitly described, may have
increased the difficulties of knowing where to get the data for the reports
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from mentioned in section 4.4.1 on page 55. Adding an ER diagram (El-
masri and Navathe 2000) for the SalarySystem database would probably
have been found useful for the developers implementing the reports.
4.4.2 The role of the SRS
The SRS document was made as a result of the RussCo analysis of Sa-
larySystem, and the first version was delivered to the Norwegians one
month after project start. The SRS itself defines its purpose to be a “spe-
cification for the SalarySystem project”, and thus provide a framework
within which the development process could continue. However, this
thesis interprets that the primary purpose of the SRS was to establish to
ScanSys their technical competence and capability in software develop-
ment and gain the contract, rather than as a document that could serve
as a basis for estimation and to guide the future development work. Both
the SRS and the RussCo estimates were made before the contract of the
project was signed, and since RussCo had tried to get into the Scand-
inavian market for some time, this contract—and the relationship with
ScanSys—was seen to be important.
Calculation-based trust has to do with the assessment of whether the
trustee is able to perform an action that is beneficial (Rousseau, Sitkin,
Burt, and Camerer 1998; Kim and Prabhakar 2000; Sabherwal 1999).
This description fits with how the RussCo staff considered the relation-
ship with ScanSys. However, while getting the contract was a matter
connected to the organizational level of the project, the calculation-
based trust was also important for the testers and developers on the “mi-
cro level”. That is, the organizational level below the RussCo general
management. Because RussCo wanted to show its competence, and both
the SRS and the estimates were made before the contract was signed,
these two documents were influenced by the wish to get the contract.
By applying the attributes of trust, the intention of making the SRS
can be seen as an attempt to make the Norwegians build competence-
based trust in the Russians. One argument for this interpretation is the
extent of which the Russians found the document useful during imple-
mentation:
The SRS was only useful for common questions, for example
what report to create and its function.
— RussCo developer III
Another argument is the role of the SRS with respect to software
methodology:
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[. . . ] development happened at the same time the SRS was
made.
— RussCo developer IV
Because the analysis and design phases of software development usu-
ally precede the development phase (Sommerville 2001), it is unreason-
able to believe that the purpose of the SRS was to support the develop-
ment. Also, one of the developers was explicitly told by his supervisor
not to use the SRS in his work. He summarized the role of the SRS
during the development process in the following way:
Forget about the SRS, just fix the bug.
— RussCo developer III
Still, the Russians spent much time making the SRS as well as revising
it according to the Norwegians’ evaluation. Furthermore, the attempt to
base the SRS on IEEE Std 830-1998 (1998) is interpreted to be a way for
RussCo of demonstrating competence-based trust too. Because IEEE is a
well-known authority within software development, using their standard
is a way of being associated with its competence. However, since RussCo
did not follow the standard to a large extent when the SRS was written,
this is found to be an attempt of demonstrating competence they did not
possess. However, ScanSys later adopted the SRS template internally
because they found it to be professional.
The evaluation of the SRS at ScanSys took place in the following way:
The Norwegian project members looked through the document page by
page and checked whether it was correct. The errors they found was put
into a report and sent to RussCo. They had much iteration before the
SRS was seen to be satisfying. During a period of three months, the SRS
was updated ten times. However, the Norwegians did not check either
for missing parts or considered if the detail level was appropriate for Rus-
sCo to be able to develop the system. The ScanSys staff was impressed
by the quality of the document, and convinced that RussCo was technic-
ally capable of doing the project. One of the Norwegians who joined the
evaluation said:
It was a very accurate document, and I was impressed that
[RussCo] managed to make it with the limited amount of in-
formation they had available. The quality of the SRS proves
that [RussCo] are professional.
— ScanSys test coordinator
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According to this quote, RussCo succeeded in building competence-
based trust although the focus on data flow and technical issues later
turned out to reflect the too narrow focus of the RussCo staff because
other important issues were ignored. Given this incompleteness of the
SRS, the evaluation of the document in Norway did not reveal these
aspects. Instead it made the Norwegians confident about the Russians’
competence.
Goodwill is seen to be important for an individual’s tendency to trust
others. Dependent on the personalities of the ScanSys staff evaluating
the SRS, they could assume (1) the Russians possessed knowledge about
the rest of the system too, it just was not included in the SRS, or (2)
the SRS was incomplete, so they did not possess the appropriate know-
ledge of the system. These two examples thus illustrate two opposite
points of view dependent on an individual’s tendency to trust. However,
even if the ScanSys staff assumed (1) rather than (2), the conclusion that
they had goodwill trust does not immediately make sense. Because the
evaluation of the SRS was influenced by a number of other factors like
lack of domain knowledge and commitment to the project, such a point
of view would be to jump to conclusions. Furthermore, since powerful
organizations are more willing to trust then weak ones (Sydow 1998),
and ScanSys had the upper hand during this time of the project, these
reasons might just as well explain the benevolence of the ScanSys staff.
Thus, goodwill trust is difficult to identify based upon the above descrip-
tion. Moreover, (1) is similar to how predictability-based trust emerges:
a way of predicting behavior is by observing patterns of behavior, and
expecting them to continue (Maguire, Phillips, and Hardy 2001). Since
the different parts of the SRS were incomplete rather than wrong, it may
have made the Norwegians expect that the Russians’ competence were
present. Thus, the Norwegians had predictability-based trust in the Rus-
sians too.
The SRS and the estimates made the Norwegians more able to under-
stand the Russians’ knowledge of SalarySystem and its domain. Since
these documents were detailed with respect to several aspects of the
Russians’ knowledge, they can be looked upon as structural mechan-
isms. The two documents gave the Norwegians a chance to review the
Russians’ understanding of the old system as a result of the evaluation
process. Also, the weekly reports from Russia are considered structural
mechanisms. However, considering the near-breakdown phase and the
Norwegians not knowing about the slow progress of the project, this
thesis interprets these structural mechanisms to be insufficient during
the estimation process because of the low degree of actual predictability
they provided.
Since the SRS creation took place in the initial phase of the project,
establishing competence-based trust was important for RussCo. But as
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time went by and the software deliveries from Russia contained lots of
bugs, the competence-based trust disappeared. Betrayal is defined as “a
voluntary violation of mutually known pivotal expectations of the trus-
tor by the trusted party (trustee), which has the potential to threaten the
well-being of the trustor” (Elangovan and Shapiro 1998, p. 548). Accord-
ing to this definition, betrayal takes place only when the expectations of
the trustor are violated and the action is voluntary. In the project, the
Russians were found not to possess the knowledge about SalarySystem
expected by the Norwegians, and so their degree of competence-based
trust decreased. However, the Russians did not necessarily intend to lie
about their competence. The interpretation of this thesis is that the Rus-
sians initially in the project did not have the knowledge about SalarySys-
tem which they tried to show in the SRS, but that they believed they were
going to learn before the project suffered. However, they underestimated
the complexity and the amount of business logic of SalarySystem:
We missed some forms in the beginning of the project. We
found almost all of them, and their calculations were quite
right, but we underestimated the complexity of some forms.
Some examples of complex forms is the one about absence
from work, and about complex custom control. These are
defined by data from the database. At first glance they look
easy, but we had to implement three to four variants before
we made it work correctly.
— RussCo project coordinator
Thus, considering the deviation between the SRS and the RussCo
competence an act of betrayal, would not fit with the definition. How-
ever, the degree of competence-based trust the Norwegians had in the
Russians decreased.
4.5 The near-breakdown
The use of TestTool is seen to illustrate some of the issues of trust during
the near-breakdown. Below, TestTool is described in detail with an em-
phasis on these issues. The description is followed by an analysis of trust
during the near-breakdown.
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4.5.1 Properties of TestTool
TestTool is an off-the-shelf product5 which helps software projects organ-
izing the development process. It can be used to manage bugs and fea-
ture requests as well as other issues throughout the development cycle. A
development project using TestTool has a database that can be accessed
by all assigned project members. TestTool also has a web-based client,
which makes it suitable to support virtual teams since the database can
be accessed from wherever there is an Internet connection. In Norway all
project members had access to the web-based version of TestTool, while
all the Russian project members had access in addition to the company
management. The TestTool database was located and administrated at
RussCo. RussCo also initiated the use of the application in the project.
Figure 4.6 provides an overview of the use of TestTool. As the figure
shows, the work taking place in a project concerning development and
testing is registered. In turn, TestTool uses these data to produce output
which is useful for the project members.
Register new bug
Assign Defect
Estimate fix
Describe fix
Verify fix
Close defect
Re−open defect
Release notes
Add comments
INPUT: TESTTOOL DATABASE OUTPUT:
Need customer input
View bugs
Bugs to be fixed
Bugs to be tested
Reports
Figure 4.6: Input and output in TestTool.
The use of TestTool in the SalarySystem project had several advant-
ages: it enabled the Norwegians to overlook the work taking place at
the other site as well as the development process itself, it increased the
5Off-the-shelf software products are made for a large number of users in contrast to
software made for a special purpose.
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understanding of SalarySystem at the Russian site, and improved the re-
porting of project status. Most of the project members were satisfied with
the use of TestTool in the project:
[TestTool] makes it easy to assign bugs, cooperate, easy to see
how many tasks you must solve, how many bugs et cetera.
— RussCo developer II
Bugs in TestTool
This section describes how bugs are represented in TestTool. The descrip-
tion is divided into two parts; one about the data fields of the bugs, and
one about the actions that can be performed on them. TestTool allows
customization to a large extent, which has taken place in the project:
Almost all the fields were changed due to specific needs in the
[SalarySystem] project.
— RussCo tester I
Because of this, the following description is a mix of the TestTool
default features and the RussCo customizations. In the SalarySystem
project the terms “defect”, “bug”, and “error” were used to denote the
same thing. In this thesis “bug” is being used consistently.
There are 94 data fields for each bug in TestTool; some are shown in
figure 4.7 on the following page while others are shown in other modes.
There are around 20 other modes for each bug depending on what action
the user wants to perform. For instance, generating a report is performed
using a different mode than assigning a bug. The fields are not equally
important for understanding the use of TestTool, so a selection of fields
found to be most relevant is made.
The bugs chosen not to be described in detail can be divided into four
groups. The first group of fields enables attachments of screen shots,
source code, and other files relevant to a bug. These attachments may
help the tester or developer to better understand how to fix or test the
bug. The second group of fields contains the names of who performed
different actions (these actions are described in more detail below). The
third group contains the dates of when these actions were performed,
while the last group consists of additional information about the bug.
Examples from the latter group are how the bug was fixed, notes from the
customer about the verification done by the developer, and the difference
between the actual and the estimated time to fix a bug.
The following is a description of the most relevant fields in TestTool.
The fields are presented using the sequence they in which they appear in
figure 4.7 as a starting point:
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Figure 4.7: A bug as it is represented in TestTool.
Number: Every bug has a unique number which is useful for identifica-
tion.
Summary: A short text describing the bug. In the SalarySystem project,
this description consisted of the navigation path from SalarySystem
leading to the bug, for example “Termin | Årsavslutning | Lønns- og
trekkoppgaver“. This made the bugs easily identifiable.
Status: This field is generated by TestTool. It shows the status of the
bug as well as whom it eventually is assigned to. The status can
be either Open, Open (Re-opened), Open (Verify failed), Fixed,
Closed (Verified), or Closed (see figure 4.7). This field is useful for
generating reports of for example how many bugs are open, how
many bugs are closed et cetera.
Disposition: The field has the following values:
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• Open – Not Reviewed
• Open – Reviewed
• Need Customer Input
• OK to Implement
• Fix In Future Release
• Hold
• Rejected
Bugs in the project marked “Need customer input”, are put into a
report and sent to ScanSys together with the weekly report. The
ScanSys staff then knew what information RussCo needed.
Type: Describes the kind of bug. The field has the following values:
• Crash – Data Loss
• Crash – No Data Loss
• Incorrect Functionality
• Erroneous Data
• Cosmetic
• Feature Request
• Investigate
RussCo also added the value “GUI” which means that the bug has
to do with the graphical user interface. The field is also useful when
deciding what priority the bug should be given.
Priority: The value of this field denotes how quickly the bug has to be
fixed. In the project, the values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 were used. The
Russian project manager prioritized the bugs, and the developers
and testers fixed or tested the bugs according to the priorities on
the bugs assigned to them.
Product: Means what part of the project is being influenced by the bug.
One example from the case is “RC1” which means “release candid-
ate 1”.
Component: Means what component in the source code the bug be-
longs to.
Severity: The developer’s personal opinion about how severe the bug is
described by the following values:
• Causes Crash
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• No Workaround
• Workaround
• Cosmetic
In contrast to the field “type” which is a more objective description
of the severity of the bug, this field allows the developer to give his
or her own opinion of the bug.
Entered by: Name of person who entered the bug into TestTool.
Date entered: The date the bug was entered into TestTool.
Version: In the SalarySystem project, the filed was used to denote what
build the bug was found on. In comparison to the field called
product, this field presupposes several versions between every pro-
duct release.
Steps to reproduce: This field contains a written description on how to
reproduce a bug. The field is useful for developers and testers to
find the bug in the system (see also figure 4.7).
Description: Contains a more extensive description of the bug in addi-
tion to other relevant information.
The fields described above provide extensive information about a bug
with respect to what part of the system it belongs to, what kind of bug it is
et cetera. This information provided a common understanding between
the two sites.
Actions
Every time an action is performed on a bug, this event is logged by Test-
Tool. This information is stored in a form called “Workflow” which
provides an overview over the history of the bug. For every bug, the
following actions can be performed:
Register new bug: When a bug is found during testing, it is put into Test-
Tool. TestTool automatically gives the new bug a unique number.
Assign defect: A developer or tester gets a bug assigned to him or her for
fixing, testing, or verifying. In the project, the Russian project man-
ager did most of the assignment. Other project members assigned
bugs to some extent though.
Estimate fix: After a bug is registered, the amount of work it takes to fix
it is estimated. In the project the Russian project manager did most
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of the estimation. If the developer who gets the bug assigned to
him or her for fixing finds the estimate to be wrong, he or she can
re-estimate the bug.
Describe fix: After the bug is fixed, information about the fixing is put
into TestTool. Examples of fields to be filled in are “Resolution”
(how the bug was fixed) and “Hours to fix”.
Verify fix: When a bug is fixed, it is assigned to a developer who verifies
it. Dependent on whether the fix was correct, the bug either passes
or fails the test. If it passes, the status is set to “closed”. If it fails,
the status is set to open and the bug must be reassigned.
Close defect: A bug can be closed for several reasons, having any status
except from “closed”.
Re-Open defect: A closed bug can be re-opened which gives it the status
“Open”.
Release Notes: The release notes are the basis for readme files and other
documentation about the project.
Add comments: Comments can be added to any bug. Such comments
may concern details relevant to the bug.
Figure 4.8 on the next page, based on the interviews of staff in Scan-
Sys and RussCo, describes the workflow in the SalarySystem project as
the actions described above were performed. Most of the bugs found in
Norway were put into TestTool by the Norwegian test coordinator, while
in Russia the testers in the test department registered most of the bugs.
The process from a bug was found until it was fixed and closed some-
times took up to two weeks.
When a bug was found at the Norwegian test department, the tester
sent an e-mail to the Norwegian test coordinator describing the bug.
When the ScanSys testers tested, they had two PCs running; one with
the old SalarySystem, and one with the redesign version. The testers’ job
was to report any difference between the old and the new version. Be-
cause not all of the differences they found were bugs, this decision was
made by the Norwegian test coordinator. Examples of differences not
being bugs are minor changes to the GUI, or improvements made by the
Russians caused by unsatisfying performance in the old system.
When a bug was found at the Russian test department, the bug was
put into TestTool by the tester who found it. When a bug was put into
TestTool, an e-mail was automatically sent to the project mailing list.
This also happened when someone at the Norwegian site registered new
bugs, and increased the Norwegians’ knowledge about the work progress
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A bug is found at
the Norwegian
test−department.
The tester sends
an e−mail to the
Norwegian test−
coordinator describing
the bug.
The Norwegian test−
coordinator checks 
if it is a bug.
The Russian project manager analyzes the bug. She
decides what component it belongs to, checks for
duplicates, prioritizes the bug according to the
nature of it, and assigns it to a developer. If the
bug is poorly described, she requests more
information about the bug.
A bug is found at
the Russian test−
department.
The developer looks at the bug, 
and re−estimates it if necessary.
Then he or she fixes the bug.
The tester tests
the bug to check
whether the fix
is correct.
The fix is verified, 
and the bug is closed.
The fix fails the test.
=  Default workflow
=  Variant workflow
The Russian project manager
assigns the bug to a tester. (If
the bug is found by one of the
Russian testers, the same tester
who found the bug also verifies
the fix).
The Norwegian test−
coordinator puts the
bug into TestTool.
The tester puts the
bug into TestTool.
Figure 4.8: The process of fixing a bug.
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in Russia. This overlooking was especially important in Norway after
the near-breakdown of the project when the Norwegian project members
started questioning the Russians’ ability to finish the project.
All new bugs were analyzed by the Russian project manager. She
checked for duplicates, filled in additional information about the bug,
prioritized it, and assigned it to a developer. If the bug was poorly de-
scribed, she requested more information.
When a bug was properly described, the Russian project manager as-
signed it to a developer. The two main criteria for this selection were
availability and skills. Then the developer fixed the bug, and set the
value of the “Status” field to “Fixed”. After the bug was fixed, the Rus-
sian project manager assigned it to a tester for verification. If the bug
was initially found by a Russian tester, the same tester also verified the
fix. A bug either passed or failed the verification. If it passed, the bug
was closed. If it failed, the bug was reassigned to a developer for fixing
and the same cycle was repeated.
Reporting
Another feature of TestTool is the reporting function. TestTool provides a
set of report templates with information about the bugs and the bug cor-
rection process. It is also possible for users to design their own reports
containing any data from the TestTool database. Every week during the
project, a report was prepared by RussCo and sent to ScanSys. This re-
port contained information about project status, planned activities, and
issues that needed input from the customer. Much of the contents in the
weekly report were generated by TestTool. Figure 4.9 shows the distri-
bution of different kinds of bugs during the weeks before the report was
issued.
Figure 4.9: Part of the weekly report. Data generated by TestTool.
Since the weekly report enabled the Norwegians to monitor the work
progress, this feature increased the ScanSys knowledge about the work
taking place in Russia.
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Once a week, RussCo also generated a report from TestTool which
contained all bugs where the field “Disposition” was set to “Need Cus-
tomer Input”. This report was issued together with the weekly report,
and had two kinds of bugs: (1) bugs found by the Russians, but which
they did not fully understand, and (2) bugs found by the Norwegians,
but which were poorly documented. Figure 4.10 on the next page shows
two bugs from the “Need Customer Input” report. When ScanSys got the
report, they prepared an answer and replied using e-mail. When RussCo
found the reply to be sufficient, the status of the bug in the report was
changed to “Clarified”.
Because the reports generated by TestTool enabled a common under-
standing on a detailed level between the two companies, it became easier
to share relevant information between the sites.
4.5.2 The role of TestTool
In the beginning of the SalarySystem project, TestTool was put into use.
But because the Russian software deliveries were incomplete with re-
spect to functionality and GUIs, the use of TestTool was found not to be
useful and thus abandoned:
There were so many bugs in the redesigned source code in
the beginning so we could not test for more than a couple of
hours before it all broke down, so TestTool was not useful. At
this time, our frustration was big.
— ScanSys project manager
Frustration was also present at the Russian site where the developers
tried to increase their knowledge of SalarySystem:
We tried to understand the business logic from the source
code, but did not make it.
— RussCo developer I
Trust in Norway
Four months after project start a new attempt to use TestTool was made.
At this point, the software deliveries from Russia still contained many
bugs, but the Russians did not register them in TestTool. Figure 4.11
on page 74 shows the number of bugs reported in TestTool, and how
these numbers corresponded with the key events of the project. These
events influenced the number of bugs registered in TestTool, and thus
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Figure 4.10: The bugs that need customer input.
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Figure 4.11: Number of bugs registered in TestTool compared with the
key events in the project.
made the project members—both in Norway and Russia—feel more or
less confident about the project.
In many software projects, few bugs would probably have been con-
sidered positive. But since the Norwegians found many bugs in the soft-
ware deliveries, few bugs in TestTool were seen to indicate a low degree
of domain understanding in Russia. However, when the number of bugs
later in the project increased, the Norwegians once again felt confident
about the Russians’ competence:
Because of the increase in bugs reported, I felt safer about the
bug correction done by the Russians.
— ScanSys test coordinator
Since the use of TestTool increased the Norwegians’ confidence about
the SalarySystem project, TestTool is seen as a structural mechanism.
Other attributes were also influenced though. First, as described above,
the competence-based trust was influenced by the number of bugs re-
ported. Second, TestTool also increased the Norwegians’ knowledge
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about the development in Russia which, in turn, influenced the degree
of knowledge-based trust. Third, because of this increased knowledge,
the calculation-based trust was also influenced. For instance, when the
Norwegians started questioning the Russian competence, the perceived
opportunity of the ScanSys–RussCo relationship would necessarily be
influenced too. Fourth, since knowledge-based, competence-based, and
structure-based trust all has to do with predictability, this attribute of
trust was also influenced. For instance, section 2.2.3 on page 23 de-
scribes two ways of increasing predictability: (1) enable monitoring, and
(2) influence the behavior of the partner. Considering (1), TestTool did
increase the ability to monitor the development in Russia, and (2) en-
abled the Norwegians to better describe SalarySystem which influenced
the Russian development, so the predictability increased too. However,
as described above, the use of TestTool both increased and decreased the
degree of trust during the project. This is in accordance with the descrip-
tion of predictability where the predictable behavior not necessarily is
the preferred behavior.
One example of how TestTool improved the predictability is an event
that happened at the end of the SalarySystem project. Because the Russi-
ans tested using automated tests, they did not find bugs in the SalarySys-
tem GUI. Automated tests means testing by putting data from a backup
file into the system instead of entering data as end-users. The Norwe-
gian test coordinator became aware of this kind of testing by looking at
the kinds of bugs in TestTool. Because of the detailed information about
every bug registered in TestTool, he was able to see that the Russian test-
ing did not reveal all kinds of bugs. When he confronted the Russian
project manager with this, she told about the automated tests, and they
agreed that the Russians should test as end-users like the Norwegian test
department did. Later, when bugs from the GUI registered in Russia ap-
peared in TestTool, the Norwegian test coordinator got the impression
that the project was moving in the right direction.
Trust in Russia
TestTool as a structural mechanism also influenced the RussCo degree
of trust in the Norwegians. During the first months of the project, the
Russians were frustrated because they did not understand SalarySystem.
But when TestTool was put into use, it enabled a more detailed feedback
from the Norwegians.
As described earlier, the “Need customer input” document—gene-
rated by TestTool—was sent to Norway every week. This document made
it easier for the Russians to tell what parts of the system they needed to
have explained. And since the Norwegians suddenly had a detailed re-
quest for what the Russians needed to have explained, they were able
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to give the right explanations. This was important because the Russians
lacked trust in the Norwegian competence too. The following was said
about how the Russians considered the Norwegian competence early in
the project:
[The ScanSys developer] does not have much domain know-
ledge to transfer.
— RussCo general manager
When the Norwegians suddenly gave adequate answers to the Rus-
sians’ questions, the Russians’ competence-based trust in the Norwegi-
ans increased. Also, the Russians’ faith in a successful project increased
which, in turn, built predictability-based trust.
4.5.3 Violated expectations
When the Norwegians’ trust in the Russians’ competence deteriorated,
TestTool was important as described above. However, other events in the
SalarySystem project were important too. When the Norwegians sugges-
ted the project was running late, they did so because they tried to save
the project from a total failure. But because the Russians did not admit
to the problems, and later asked for six more months, the Norwegians
felt they were being fooled:
When the Russians did not admit the project was running late,
it turned the situation upside-down.
— ScanSys support coordinator
The situation made the Norwegians unwilling to go for a compromise,
and instead they blamed RussCo for the delay. From the description of
betrayal, an action both has to violate the expectations of the trustor
and be voluntary to be called betrayal. According to the quote above,
the Norwegians’ expectations about the project were violated. Deciding
whether the action was voluntary, on the other hand, requires a more
thorough discussion.
From the Russian side, the advantage of not telling the Norwegians
about the possible delay would be none. In the beginning of the pro-
ject, the intention of not telling about their lack of understanding, as
described in section 4.4.2 on page 60, was to get the contract. But after
the contract was signed, such a motivation was no longer present. Ac-
cording to the contract of the project, the project could be stopped after
any finished phase, so there would be no calculation-based argument
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for the Russians not to tell about the possible delay. Furthermore, be-
traying ScanSys would mean the end of the project, and thus no op-
portunities for further contracts. Instead, this thesis suggests that the
near-breakdown took place because the Russians lacked the appropriate
knowledge about SalarySystem. This lack of knowledge also included
knowledge about their own degree of knowledge:
We should have understood [one month after project start]
that we could not finish the project in time because we did
not have the people.
— Former RussCo project manager
Once again, the possible betrayal is instead seen to be a result of other
factors more than an intention to betray the partner. Still, during the
near-breakdown the Norwegians’ degree of competence-based trust was
low.
4.5.4 Unexpected behavior
When the former RussCo project manager was removed at the near-
breakdown meeting in Russia, the Norwegians who attended the meeting
were surprised. They were not used to such behavior, neither in Norway
nor Russia. Furthermore, such behavior was not preferred because the
reaction was considered too strong, and the blame was put on one per-
son.
Since predictability stems from observing patterns of behavior and
expecting them to continue, the removal of the project manager was a
break in these patterns because the situation was unexpected. However,
the episode only happened once, thus, it did not become the expected
pattern of behavior. Still, the episode made a strong impression on the
Norwegians, so this thesis interprets the Norwegians to more likely ex-
pect unanticipated episodes in the future. In figure 4.12 on the next page,
the result of the situation is illustrated. The Norwegians are found to
have had a medium degree of information about the Russians (because
of interaction), and a low degree of predictability-based trust because
unanticipated episodes in the future suddenly became more likely.
The episode is also connected to knowledge-based trust since the
Norwegians through the meeting had first-hand experience of the Rus-
sians’ behavior. However, as the interaction did not build trust, it is
important to notice that not all knowledge about the partner in a GSO
relationship builds trust.
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Figure 4.12: The removed project manager.
4.6 The recovery phase
After the near-breakdown, the performance of the SalarySystem project
improved. During this phase, several changes were made which all con-
tributed to the positive trend. These changes are discussed in this section
focusing on their relation with trust.
One of the positive changes was the introduction of the test cases—
documents describing the use of SalarySystem. These documents were
prepared by the Norwegians and sent to Russia five months after pro-
ject start. The test cases improved the knowledge sharing in a number of
ways, which helped the Russians understand SalarySystem better. Alto-
gether there were made 15 test cases.
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4.6.1 Contents of the test cases
Each test case describes a scenario or operation considered difficult.
Some examples of difficult scenarios are the tax and salary rules related
to sailors, foreigners living in Norway, or Norwegians living at Svalbard.
People from these groups follow different tax and salary rules, and the
business logic encapsulated into the source code can make it difficult to
understand. Even the highly skilled SalarySystem support staff at Scan-
Sys sometimes found the business logic difficult to understand due to its
complex nature:
Don’t mix sense and logic when it comes to tax rules.
— ScanSys support coordinator
Several operations in SalarySystem may also be difficult to perform
because the Norwegian tax and salary rules are encapsulated into Sa-
larySystem, and consequently mirrored in the use of the system. Some
examples are import or export of data, tasks related to the annual bal-
ance of accounts, or salary calculation. The test case in figure 4.13 on
the following page, considers the latter operation.
In addition to a thorough description about how to perform different
tasks in SalarySystem, the test cases provide the input and the corres-
ponding output of a specific task. These values are stored in a separate
file.
As the test case in figure 4.13 shows, the use of different parts of Sa-
larySystem is described in detail with respect to what buttons to push,
what values to fill in and so on. In the given test case, 63 different op-
erations concerning printing of reports, performing a salary calculation,
generating a backup file and so forth is described. The operations are not
directly connected, and can be performed independently. The sequence
of the operations describes the most common way of using SalarySystem.
One important aspect of the use of SalarySystem is that every year is
divided into periods. Each period is closed when the salaries are being
paid. Because the use of SalarySystem—and the system itself—is highly
influenced by this division, the test cases are divided into periods too.
Every test case consists of four periods, each describing approximately
the same operations. However, the differences between the parts are ne-
cessary in order to simulate the use of SalarySystem during a whole year.
For example, in Norway employees pay half tax in December, so the last
period of the test case would consequently describe a salary calculation
using half tax.
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Figure 4.13: Part of test case number six.
4.6.2 The role of the test cases
The test cases were helpful in several ways: First, they made the Russians
find the “hidden forms”. Because of the Norwegian tax and salary rules,
some forms in SalarySystem are displayed only when specific data are put
into the system. For example, employees being more than 62 years of age,
follow special tax and salary rules. The user has to register such persons
in order to access the “hidden forms”, so these values are given in the
test cases. Second, the test cases helped the Russians to find any bugs
between the input and the output. That is, since the Russians tested using
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automated tests to a large extent, it made them miss bugs in the interface.
When they got the test cases, their attention turned against testing as end-
users which generated more bugs. The lack of understanding about the
use of SalarySystem was one reason for this until the test cases gave them
a more integral understanding of the system. Third, the test cases helped
the Russians trace the logical sequence of use of SalarySystem. Looking
at figure 4.13, such a sequence could be to perform a salary calculation
before printing the report.
The test cases increased the Russians’ understanding of SalarySystem
and the business logic encapsulated into it. That was positive in several
ways because the limited amount of understanding about the SalarySys-
tem project was a problem for the Russians’ ability to make the project
successful:
If we had got the test cases earlier, we would have been able
to make more accurate estimations.
— RussCo project coordinator
Since the test cases increased the Russians’ understanding of Salary-
System and its embedded business logic, this thesis suggests that com-
petence-based trust was built both in Norway and Russia because of the
documents. When the software deliveries from Russia were improved
with respect to functionality and finished GUIs, the Norwegians felt good
about the Russians’ knowledge about SalarySystem, and their compet-
ence-based trust in the Russians increased. However, the Norwegians’
understanding of the Russians’ increased competence was also due to
TestTool where they could monitor the progress of the work in Russia.
At RussCo, the detailed test cases increased the Russians’ impression
of the Norwegian knowledge about SalarySystem because they suddenly
got adequate explanations on problems they had. Thus, the Russians’
competence-based trust in the Norwegians increased as a result of the
test cases too.
The test cases also fit the description of a structure, and considering
the importance of the documents in the project, this thesis interprets the
test cases to have built structure-based trust in Russia. From the descrip-
tion of structure as an attribute of trust, the test cases can be used to
influence the behavior of the partner. For instance, the Norwegians—by
sending the test cases—explicitly taught the Russians how to understand
SalarySystem which, in turn, influenced the development in Russia.
Considering the test cases as structural mechanisms, one question to
ask is whether the degree of structure was appropriate during the project.
Section 2.2.3 on page 23 identifies lack of structure as equal to excessive
faith in trust. Because of the problems the Russians had understanding
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the use of SalarySystem during the early phases of the project—with poor
effort made to help them—the Norwegians’ faith in the Russians’ com-
petence was excessive. Also, the Russians would have preferred to get the
test cases earlier. When the Russians got the test cases, their understand-
ing increased which was positive for the project. Thus, in this thesis, the
degree of structural mechanisms is interpreted to have been too low until
the near-breakdown and appropriate after the test cases were introduced.
The test cases being a structural mechanism was guarding against lack of
competence in Russia.
4.6.3 Other positive changes
In addition to the introduction of TestTool and the test cases, several
changes were made in the SalarySystem project which influenced the de-
grees of trust in Norway and Russia. These changes are discussed below
in relation to trust.
When the Norwegians visited Russia ten months after project start,
the meeting had several advantages. During the meeting, the Norwegi-
ans met the testers and developers in RussCo for the first time. Prior
to the meeting, the project members only knew the names of their col-
leagues. This interaction was important for knowledge-based trust to
appear between the individuals in the project. For instance, the Scan-
Sys test coordinator was more confident the Russians could finish the
project after the face-to-face meeting. Thus, his predictability about the
project was also influenced. During the meeting, the Norwegians also
got a better chance to explain details about SalarySystem and its embed-
ded business logic to the Russians which increased the Russians’ under-
standing. As a consequence, the Russians’ impression of the Norwegian
knowledge about SalarySystem increased too. This bidirectional way of
building trust is quite similar to how the test cases influenced the degree
of trust.
In Norway, knowledge-based trust was also built as a result of the im-
proved reporting from Russia during the recovery phase. These reports—
partly generated by TestTool—contained information about the work tak-
ing place in Russia. Because the reports described the work in Russia
in a detailed way, this thesis interprets the reports to have increased the
knowledge-based trust in Norway. Competence-based trust was built too
because the Norwegians could monitor the progress of the development
in Russia.
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4.7 Interdependency
In the beginning of the SalarySystem project, ScanSys was the strong
part operating in a buyer’s market. RussCo, on the other hand, had a
strong calculation-based trust in the relationship. However, as the pro-
ject went by, the progress of the SalarySystem project escalated and the
knowledge of SalarySystem and its embedded business logic in Russia
increased. As a result, ScanSys found itself getting more dependent on
RussCo. In addition, the Norwegians started to consider RussCo as a
reliable and competent software supplier useful in future software pro-
jects. Using the attributes of trust, this shift in the relationship can be
looked upon as ScanSys had got calculation-based trust in RussCo. The
development of such trust was in contrast to how the Norwegians’ cal-
culation-based trust prior to the SalarySystem project was in GSO as
a phenomenon more than RussCo as a future business partner. After
the problems related to communication, knowledge sharing, project re-
porting, and shift of staff, ScanSys found the relationship had become
advantageous. The episode where ScanSys decided to finish phase eight
of the project internally, but still pay RussCo $14 000 according to the
contract, is in this thesis interpreted as an example of how ScanSys had
got calculation-based trust in RussCo. Instead of claiming their right and
let RussCo finish the eighth phase—which might had been advantage-
ous in the short term—they found the other solution to be better in the
long run. Sahay, Krishna, and Nicholson (2003) suggest that calculation-
based trust is strongly associated with the early stages of the relationship.
However, in the ScanSys–RussCo relationship such trust is seen to be
present more than two years after the relationship was formed.
Since the calculation-based trust was connected to the faith ScanSys
had in RussCo as a competent software supplier, competence-based trust
was important too. That is, the Russians’ competence was one of the
reasons the Norwegians had got calculation-based trust in RussCo, so
the competence-based trust influenced the degree of calculation-based
trust. Moreover, the improved interaction across the sites increased the
Norwegians’ degree of knowledge about the Russians as described in the
previous section. This knowledge is seen as one of the reasons for the
Norwegians’ calculation-based trust too.
From the descriptions of the attributes of trust in chapter 2, com-
petence and knowledge were seen to increase predictability. That is, if
(at least) one these attributes are present, predictability is more likely to
emerge. In addition, the weekly reports—considered structural mech-
anisms—increased the predictability too. At last, calculation and pre-
dictability being quite similar, they influence each other as well. The
relationships between the kinds of trust being present at ScanSys in the
interdependency phase is illustrated in figure 4.14 on the following page.
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The arrows in the figure illustrates how the attributes of trust influenced
each other.
Calculation
Predictability
Competence KnowledgeStructure
Figure 4.14: The influences between the attributes of trust being present
in the interdependency phase.
Chapter 5
Discussion
In this chapter, the findings from chapter 4 form the background of the
discussion of the main objective in this thesis:
Identify and describe trust in Global Software Outsourcing
relationships.
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the
findings about trust while the latter looks at how this new understanding
can be used to suggest ways to perform successful GSO projects. These
two parts thus reflect theoretical and practical implications respectively.
5.1 Findings about trust
In the light of the findings from the previous chapter, a legitimate ques-
tion to ask is whether and how is trust needed in GSO projects? Based
upon these findings, the suggested answer is yes. For instance, when the
project almost failed during the near-breakdown phase, the Russians had
a strong calculation-based trust. This trust made them offer to finish the
project without being paid for additional time although they did not have
to make this offer according to the contract. Thus, without trust, the pro-
ject would most likely have failed. From the Norwegian point of view,
their gut feeling during the first visit at RussCo—interpreted as know-
ledge-based trust—was an important reason for the ScanSys–RussCo re-
lationship to be initiated in the first place.
Another finding from the previous chapter is that the attributes of
trust were present in all phases of the SalarySystem project. Furthermore,
all attributes apart from betrayal were identified. That is, none of the
findings suggested that betrayal was breaking trust or not betraying was
building trust. Thus, the attribute is removed from the list of attributes
of trust. Still, betrayal is considered a threat to GSO projects, so it is
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important to be aware of such behavior. In the SalarySystem project,
both ScanSys and RussCo had their chance of potentially betraying the
partner. For instance, ScanSys could have failed to pay as agreed upon in
the contract, and RussCo could voluntarily have assigned too few people
to the project in order to save money. This thesis suggests that because
of the high degrees of calculation-based trust on both sides during the
SalarySystem project, betraying the partner was less likely to happen.
Thus, calculation-based trust is seen as a way of guarding against such
behavior.
At last, the SalarySystem project illustrated how calculation-based
trust not only was associated with the early stages of the relationship, but
was still present more than two years after the relationship was formed.
These findings about trust are implicit when the attributes of trust are
discussed in the next sections.
5.1.1 How the attributes address the factors
In chapter 2, the factors that had to be addressed by the attributes were
presented. According to these, trust was seen to be multidisciplinary,
present within and between organizations, multilevelled, related to hu-
mans and systems, changing over time, having varying degrees, being
bidirectional, and socially constructed. Since these factors were con-
sidered necessary to be addressed for the attributes of trust to have ex-
planatory power in the GSO context, another evaluation—based on the
findings from chapter 4—is provided below. The findings are illustrated
with examples from the SalarySystem project.
Trust is multidisciplinary, so the attributes of trust draw upon ideas
from sociology, economics, and psychology in order to address the diver-
ging views of trust considered relevant in the GSO context. In the Sa-
larySystem project, ideas from the different disciplines were found to be
relevant in the following way: First, the structure attribute, based upon
ideas from sociology, was used to explain why mechanisms like the SRS,
TestTool, the weekly reports, and the test cases were important in the
project. Second, the idea of calculation from the economic literature
was used to explain why the SalarySystem project was initiated. At last,
goodwill from the psychology literature was used to understand how the
Norwegians interpreted the first meeting at RussCo.
This thesis looks at trust within and between organizations, and the
findings from chapter 4 suggest that trust is important in both these en-
vironments. For instance, the calculation-based trust the Russians had in
ScanSys was present in addition to how trust—or lack of trust—was im-
portant within RussCo when the Russian project manager was removed
during the near-breakdown.
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Trust being different regarding what organizational level it is studied
on, was found to be addressed when the attributes were applied on the
SalarySystem project. For instance, when the RussCo general manage-
ment had calculation-based trust in getting the SalarySystem contract,
the RussCo developers worked hard in order to make the Norwegians
build competence-based trust.
Trust coming from both systems and humans were addressed by
the attributes too. As described above, structural mechanisms like the
weekly reports, the SRS, TestTool, and the test cases were important
when building trust in addition to the Norwegians’ competence-based
trust in the “Delphi Guru”.
Figure 5.1 summarizes the results from chapter 4 concerning trust in
Norway. The figure presents the results in a schematic way compared to
the description of trust from the previous chapter. This is done in order
to illustrate tendencies about trust in the SalarySystem project. As the
figure shows, trust in the project changed as time went by. For instance,
ScanSys had calculation-based trust in GSO as a phenomenon before
the SalarySystem project was launched, but later this trust changed into
calculation-based trust in RussCo.
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Figure 5.1: Degrees of trust in Norway during the SalarySystem project.
In addition to trust changing over time, trust is also seen to have
varying degrees. That is, the trustee can trust little or much. For instance,
the Norwegians’ degree of competence-based trust decreased during the
near-breakdown before it reappeared later in the project.
Figure 5.2 on the following page summarizes the results from the pre-
vious chapter concerning trust in Russia. Comparing the figure with fig-
ure 5.1, trust was different at the two sites with respect to what attrib-
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utes were important and their associated degrees. Thus, different kinds
of trust were built at the two sites as a result of the same events which
make trust bidirectional. One example is how the initiation of the Sala-
rySystem project built calculation-based trust in Russia while in Norway
goodwill trust was more important during this time. Also, the way Scan-
Sys was the strong part during the early stages of the project influenced
the trust.
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Figure 5.2: Degrees of trust in Russia during the SalarySystem project.
At last, trust being socially constructed was found in the project too.
For instance, the first time the Norwegians went to Russia, the interac-
tion with the Russians built the Norwegians’ trust.
As seen above, all the factors were addressed when the attributes of
trust were applied to the SalarySystem project. Thus, with respect to
the factors, the attributes are seen to be useful for understanding trust in
GSO relationships.
5.1.2 Influence between the attributes
According to the findings from chapter 4, the attributes of trust influ-
enced each other in several ways. Based upon these findings, this thesis
suggests figure 5.3 on the next page as a model to identify and describe
trust in GSO relationships. The figure shows how the attributes of trust
are seen to influence each other. The enumeration indicates only the cor-
responding descriptions. That is, they do not indicate in what sequence
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trust appears. The arrows in the figure are described and illustrated by
examples from the SalarySystem project below:
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Competence Knowledge3
1 2
4
6
7 8
9
10
5
Figure 5.3: The relationships between the attributes of trust.
1. Goodwill influences the way individuals understand the compet-
ence of the partner. In the SalarySystem project, the Norwegians’
strong belief in the competence of the “Delphi Guru” made them
believe the Russians’ knowledge about SalarySystem and its do-
main was adequate to develop the new system.
2. Goodwill also influences the way the knowledge of the partner is
understood. Since knowledge about the partner is based upon in-
teraction, the goodwill towards the trustor will influence whether
the interaction is interpreted in a positive way. When the Norwegi-
ans visited RussCo for the first time, they interpreted characteristics
of RussCo in a positive way.
3. Structural mechanisms influence how competence trust is built. In
The SalarySystem project, the use of TestTool helped the Norwe-
gians to answer the Russians’ question which built competence-
based trust in Russia.
4. Similar to arrow 3, structural mechanisms can also influence how
knowledge trust is built. In The SalarySystem project, the use of
TestTool increased the Norwegians’ knowledge about the software
development in Russia.
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5. Structural properties like reporting mechanisms and rules for re-
sponse time increase predictability. Also, the degree of predictab-
ility is seen to influence the structural properties. In the Salary-
System project, the weekly report from Russia influenced the Nor-
wegians’ predictability about the SalarySystem project. Further-
more, one of the reasons the weekly reports were improved after
the near-breakdown, was because the degree of predictability was
considered too low.
6. The competence of the partner influences how the opportunities
and risks of a GSO project are calculated. In GSO relationships,
getting access to competent developers is sometimes an important
reason for the GSO project to take place. Thus, the company con-
siders competence as an argument when calculating whether the
relationship is advantageous. During the recovery phase, the pro-
gress of the project built the Norwegians’ calculation-based trust in
the Russians.
7. The competence of the partner influences how a GSO relationship
is predicted. When the Norwegians evaluated the SRS, they made
the prediction that the Russians possessed skills about SalarySys-
tem.
8. The knowledge about the partner influences how a GSO relation-
ship is predicted. The Norwegians recognized characteristics like a
Western organization style which increased their feeling of predict-
ability about future events.
9. Knowledge about the partner will influence the assessment of as-
sociated risks and opportunities. Prior to the SalarySystem project,
the Norwegians’ knowledge about GSO as a phenomenon built cal-
culation-based trust.
10. Since calculation and predictability are quite similar, they influence
each other. Calculation of the risks and opportunities associated
with the relationship is a way of predicting the future as well as
predictability being an aspect of calculation. The Norwegians’ in-
creased predictability about the SalarySystem project in the inter-
dependency phase influenced their calculation-based trust in the
Russians. Also, the Russians’ strong calculation-based trust during
the project influenced their feeling of predictability.
Evaluation
As figure 5.3 shows, the attributes of trust influence each other in several
ways. That is, if one attribute of trust is present, the other attribute is
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more likely to appear. Still, all the attributes can appear independently.
The figure does not explicitly tell in what sequence the attributes ap-
pear, rather how they mutually influence each other. Yet, some attributes
are associated with the early stages of the relationship. For instance,
goodwill—which has to do with personality—is present before the pro-
ject starts. However, if the individual has a low tendency to trust others,
other attributes will be more important when building trust. Further-
more, calculation-based trust is often associated with the initial phases of
a relationship, but according to the findings in the SalarySystem project,
this attribute of trust was also present later in the project. As seen in the
figure, calculation-based trust appears more likely if the other attributes
are already present. Still, being on top of the figure does not suggest that
this kind of trust appears late in the relationship. Yet, since calculation-
based trust appears as a result of knowledge-based trust which, in turn,
appears after long-time interaction, the figure explains why calculation-
based trust is also seen to be associated with more mature relationships.
There are more arrows that can be thought of, for instance how good-
will influences calculation. However, the figure is based upon findings
from the SalarySystem project where no such connection was identi-
fied. Thus, the attributes and the influences between them are considered
tendencies of how the degrees of trust can increase or decrease.
Since all the factors about trust are addressed by the attributes of
trust, these factors are implicit in the figure too. For instance, trust be-
ing socially constructed implies it will be different in other settings. In
the SalarySystem project, the Russians had problems understanding the
Norwegian tax and salary rules. Consequently, different skills will be
associated with competence in other projects.
The relationship between trust and the attributes of trust needs to
be evaluated too. However, the purpose of dividing trust into attributes
was to make trust identifiable in the GSO context, so the attributes all
describe the same phenomenon in a certain sense. Yet, as seen in figure
5.1, the attributes of trust had different degrees at the same time, and
hence they describe different aspects of trust. Furthermore, the findings
from the SalarySystem project confirmed that predictability and trust are
not the same, so the composition of the attributes is important. The
issue of what attributes must be present in order to build trust, is not
considered to a large extent in this thesis. A study of this issue would be
interesting though.
5.2 Implications for practise
In this thesis, figure 5.3 is the suggested model to identify and describe
trust in GSO projects. Implicit in this model is the factors being ad-
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dressed by the attributes of trust. Also, the model suggests how the
attributes of trust influence each other. This way of understanding trust
can be used to suggest ways of performing successful GSO projects. In
this section, knowledge sharing in the SalarySystem project is applied to
illustrate how the model can be used to understand trust.
In the SalarySystem project, knowledge sharing across the sites was
problematic. Using figure 5.3 to understand this issue, the problem can
be defined as an attempt to build knowledge-based and competence-
based trust. Moreover, since the model suggests that knowledge is easier
to gain if the appropriate structural mechanisms are in place, such mech-
anisms could increase the knowledge sharing in the project. In the Sala-
rySystem project, structural mechanisms like TestTool, the test cases, and
the improved weekly reports were found to be useful for the increased
knowledge sharing in the project. In other GSO projects, mechanisms
like contracts, deadlines, milestones, and meetings might be useful in the
same way.
According to the knowledge attribute, whose characteristics are im-
plicit in the suggested model of trust, such trust can be built as a result
of first-hand experience. Thus, one way to improve knowledge sharing
could be to increase the frequency of face-to-face meetings across the
sites. Knowledge-based trust also comes from stereotypes, so another
way of addressing the problem of knowledge sharing, is to choose the
partner from a country being similar to one’s own in order to reduce
differences in culture and language. Thus, characteristics of the partner
being familiar are considered positive for knowledge-based trust to be
built.
In the SalarySystem project, the “Cultural Liaison” was useful when
building competence-based and knowledge-based trust, and since the
attributes of trust influence each other as seen in figure 5.3, predictability
and calculation is more likely to appear as a result of his presence.
In the descriptions of the attributes of trust, several problems related
to knowledge sharing in GSO projects are identified. The description
of predictability suggests that full information about the partner is im-
possible to get, the description of competence argues that demonstrat-
ing competence develops slower in GSO projects than in a face-to-face
situation, and, at last, the knowledge attribute recommends bringing to-
gether key personnel as a way of building knowledge-based trust. The
way the attributes address the problem of knowledge sharing, is an im-
plication for practise too. For instance, the problem of management over-
head in GSO-projects is addressed by suggesting face-to-face meetings as
a way of sharing knowledge. Thus, such meetings should be taken into
consideration when estimating the associated management overhead of
a project. Furthermore, since trust is seen to change over time, the over-
head related to knowledge sharing will change as the project matures.
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In this section, the suggested model of trust has been used to identify
and describe trust in GSO relationships, and this understanding was
used to suggest ways of performing successful GSO projects.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter, the results and contributions of this thesis are summar-
ized. The main objective has been to identify and describe trust in
Global Software Outsourcing relationships. When discussing this ob-
jective, the goal has been to provide a better understanding of trust, and
use this understanding to suggest ways of performing successful GSO
projects.
Using an interpretive research approach the SalarySystem project,
having a Norwegian customer and a Russian supplier, was studied. Based
upon the study of this project and relevant literature, six attributes of
trust were suggested to identify and describe trust in GSO relationships.
The six attributes are:
Predictability: Has to do with observing characteristics about the part-
ner, and expecting these to continue. However, in cases where pre-
dictability is possible, the observed characteristics are not necessar-
ily the preferred ones.
Competence: Competence of different kinds, like knowledge about the
domain of the product and technical capability, is important in or-
der to perform successful GSO projects. Such skills might be diffi-
cult to demonstrate because of geographical distance.
Structure: Structural mechanisms include standards, rules for response
time, reporting mechanisms, and written messages. The key func-
tion of these structures is to enable predictability.
Calculation: Calculation means assessing whether a relationship will be
advantageous which includes both associated risks and opportun-
ities. Such trust is considered important not only in the early stages
of GSO relationships, but also in more mature relationships.
Goodwill: Goodwill as a source of trust refers to a general tendency to
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trust others. Individuals are different with respect to how likely
they will develop trust.
Knowledge: Long-time interaction increases the knowledge about the
partner. This knowledge makes it easier to predict the future.
In order to have explanatory power in the GSO context, eight factors
were considered necessary to be addressed by the attributes of trust. After
having applied the attributes of trust on the findings from the SalarySys-
tem project, all factors were addressed by the attributes of trust. These
factors find trust to be as follows:
• Multidisciplinary
• Present within and between organizations
• Multilevelled
• Related to humans and systems
• Changing over time
• Varying in degree
• Bidirectional
• Socially constructed
Based upon the findings from the SalarySystem project, figure 6.1 on
the following page is the suggested model to identify and describe trust in
GSO projects. The arrows in the figure show how the attributes of trust
are seen to influence each other. Implicit in this model is the factors and
the attributes of trust.
The suggested model of trust was used to identify and describe trust in
GSO relationships. Furthermore, this understanding was used to suggest
ways of performing successful GSO projects.
6.1 Future research
During the work on this thesis, several unresolved issues were identified.
These will be described below.
Since new projects between ScanSys and RussCo were launched by
the end of the SalarySystem project, it could be interesting to further ex-
plore this relationship. One objective could be to evaluate how learning
from the problems in the SalarySystem project shaped the new projects.
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Figure 6.1: The relationships between the attributes of trust.
The results and contributions of this thesis are based upon a single
case study. Thus, exploring the suggested model of trust beyond the Sa-
larySystem project would be useful in order to validate it. The model
could be applied either to new projects between ScanSys and RussCo, or
other GSO relationships.
Several concepts connected to trust were left untouched in this thesis.
Although the attributes of trust were used to describe and identify trust,
the composition of the attributes needs to be further studied. A re-
search question could be: “What attributes are necessary in order to
build trust?” In chapter 1; risk, control, power, and culture were seen
in relation to trust. In the GSO context, a study of these in addition to
trust could be interesting.
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Appendix A
Interview guide
General questions asked initially in the research process:
• What is/has been your role in the project?
• What is your education?
• What are the problems in the project?
• Has geographical distance influenced the project? How?
• Have cultural issues influenced the project? How?
• Have language differences influenced the project? How?
• How is your communication towards the other site?
• What communication tools are used?
• What have you learned from the project?
• What could have been done better?
• Why did you decide to outsource?
• How did you estimate the amount of work?
• How many employees does ScanSys/RussCo have?
• What is the product like?
Specific questions asked as the understanding of the project in-
creased:
• How many customers does SalarySystem have?
• How is TestTool being used?
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• Has RussCo customized TestTool? How?
• What does the test cases look like?
• Have the Russians initiated any changes in the product? Which?
• Will you outsource future projects to RussCo?
• Would more meetings help? Would more direct contact help the
project?
• When problems arose, did you tell ScanSys?
• How much power does the project manager have to change the
estimates?
• What is the chain of command to change the estimates?
• How were detailed technical issues about the product explained?
• Did you count lines in order to do the estimation? Why/why not?
• How is the testing done?
• How is the work being reported?
• Why was the estimates exceeded?
• How is the information infrastructure in Russia? How did it influ-
ence the project?
• What contractual obligations exist in the project?
• Why are the Finnish board members against outsourcing to Russia?
• During the first meeting in Norway, how were technical details ex-
plained?
Introducing theoretical concepts:
• Do you trust the Russians/Norwegians?
• Do you trust their competence?
• What kinds of “local knowledge” exist in the project?
Ad hoc questions (examples):
• What if the redesign had been done internally in ScanSys?
• When the project manager was removed, how did you react?
• Why was the development of SalarySystem divided into two parts?
• Why did not NetMeeting work?
